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Abstract:
This is a paper about using reputation tracking technologies to displace criminal
law enforcement and improve the tort system. The paper contains an extended
application of this idea to the regulation of motorist behavior in the United States and
examines the broader case for using technologies that aggregate dispersed information
in various settings where reputational concerns do not adequately deter antisocial
behavior.
The paper begins by exploring the existing data on “How’s My Driving?”
programs for commercial fleets. Although more rigorous study is warranted, the initial
data is quite promising, suggesting that the use of “How’s My Driving?” placards in
commercial trucks is associated with fleet accident reductions ranging from 20% to 53%.
The paper then proposes that all vehicles on American roadways be fitted with “How’s
My Driving?” placards so as to collect some of the millions of daily stranger-on-stranger
driving observations that presently go to waste. By delegating traffic regulation to the
motorists themselves, the state might free up substantial law enforcement resources,
police more effectively dangerous and annoying forms of driver misconduct that are
rarely punished, reduce information asymmetries in the insurance market, improve the
tort system, and alleviate road rage and driver frustration by providing drivers with
opportunities to engage in measured expressions of displeasure.
The paper addresses obvious objections to the displacement of criminal traffic
enforcement with a system of “How’s My Driving?”-based civil fines. Namely, it
suggests that by using the sorts of feedback algorithms that eBay and other reputation
tracking systems have employed, the problems associated with false and malicious
feedback can be ameliorated. Indeed, the false feedback problem presently appears more
soluble in the driving context than it is on eBay. Driver distraction is another potential
pitfall, but available technologies can address this problem, and the implementation of a
“How’s My Driving?” for Everyone system likely would reduce the substantial driver
distraction that already results from driver frustration and rubbernecking. The paper
also addresses the privacy and due process implications of the proposed regime. It
concludes by examining various non-driving applications of feedback technologies to
help regulate the conduct of soldiers, police officers, hotel guests, and participants in
virtual worlds, among others.
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Harnessing the knowledge created by technologies that aggregate dispersed
information has become a central concern of legal academics, economists, and
policymakers in the new millennium. Some academic work has focused on information
aggregators like Wikipedia, an online encyclopedia that anyone can contribute to, which
is more extensive than Britannica and nearly as accurate.1 Others have explored the
virtues of information markets, which seem capable of predicting future events with
greater accuracy than any assembled group of experts.2

Still more academic work

examines the growing importance of open source collaboration and peer production of
intellectual property, where thousands of computer programmers scattered around the
world team up to produce better code and then disperse immediately thereafter.3
Simultaneously, many economists have explored eBay’s extraordinarily successful
system for aggregating and displaying reputation information for millions of unique
users.4 And organizational theorists have proselytized on behalf of various knowledge
transfer strategies that improve performance in those companies and agencies that best
facilitate the efficient flow of information up and down the chain of command.5

1

See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE ch. 5
(forthcoming Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (describing the benefits of Wikipedia and other resources for
aggregating dispersed information); Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head: Jimmy Wales’
Wikipedia Comes Close to Britannica in Terms of the Accuracy of Its Science Entries, a Nature
Investigation Finds, 4381 NATURE 900, 900-01 (2005).
2
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at ch. 4; Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets,
Administrative Decisionmaking, and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933 (2004);
Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 (1999); Saul Levmore,
Simply Efficient Markets and the Role of Regulation: Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets and the
Hollywood Stock Exchange, 28 J. CORP. L. 589 (2003); Charles R. Plott, Markets as Information Gathering
Tools, 67 SOUTHERN ECON. J. 1 (2000); Charles R. Plott et al., Parimutuel Betting Markets as Information
Aggregation Devices, 22 ECON. THEORY 311 (2003); Cass. R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Statistical
Means, Deliberation, and Information Markets, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (2005).
3
See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, supra note 1, at ch. 4; Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux, and the
Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
4
See, e.g., Mikhail I. Melnik & James Alm, Does a Seller’s E-Commerce Reputation Matter?
Evidence from eBay Auctions, 50 J. INDUSTRIAL ECON. 337 (2002); Paul Resnick & Richard Zeckhauser,
Trust Among Strangers in Internet Transactions: Empirical Analysis of eBay’s Reputation System 3 (NBER
Workshop Paper 2001); Stephen S. Standifird, Reputation and e-commerce: eBay Auctions and the
Asymmetrical Impact of Positive and Negative Ratings, 27 J. MGMT. 279 (2001).
5
See, e.g., Linda Argote & Paul Ingram, Knowledge Transfer: A Basis for Competitive Advantage in
Firms, 82 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN PROCESSES 150 (2000); Bradley C. Karkkainen,
Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Margit Osterloh & Bruno S. Frey, Motivation, Knowledge Transfer,
and Organizational Forms, 11 ORGANIZATION SCI. 538 (2000); Jeremy C. Stein, Information Production
and Capital Allocation: Decentralized Versus Hierarchical Firms, 57 J. FINANCE 1891 (2002).

2

This paper takes the next step in the aggregation of dispersed information
literature.

Namely, it explores using information aggregation technologies to deter,

detect, and punish citizen misconduct. This paper will propose that we do exactly that,
focusing on the most promising and significant application of this approach to law
enforcement: traffic regulation.
The stakes associated with the problem of traffic accidents and commuting-related
stresses are enormous. Vehicular collisions are the leading killer of Americans aged 15
to 29,6 and the nation’s fourth most important cause of lost disability adjusted life years.7
Worldwide, traffic accidents kill nearly 1.2 million people annually.8 Recent economic
research has placed commuting at the very bottom of the happiness index, easily ranking
as the least pleasurable major life activity in which Americans engage.9 Despite this, the
average American worker spends more than 48 miserable minutes a day commuting to
and from work,10 completely frustrated by his inability to do anything about the relatively
small number of obnoxious drivers who are imposing substantial costs on everybody else.
There is, in short, far more blood on the pavement in the realm of traffic law than
there can ever be from intellectual property law, corporate law, or e-commerce. Yet
while scholars in those fields have begun showing how aggregated information can be
harnessed to improve laws and lives, scholars interested in transportation policy have
virtually ignored these insights.11 That blind spot is surprising, given that the dispersed

6

Michael Sivak, How Common Sense Fails Us on the Road: Contribution of Bounded Rationality to
the Annual Worldwide Toll of One Million Traffic Fatalities, TRANSP. RESEARCH PART F 259, 260 (2002);
Reginald G. Smart & Robert E. Mann, Commentary: Is Road Rage a Serious Traffic Problem?, 3 TRAFFIC
INJURY PREVENTION 183, 187 (2002).
7
Sivak, supra note 6, at 260. For an exploration of the social costs of traffic fatalities, see Gunnar
Lindberg, Traffic Insurance and Accident Externality Charges, 35 J. TRANSPORT ECON. & POL’Y 399, 414
(2001) (estimating that the total social costs of traffic accidents in Sweden is equal to 2.7% of that nation’s
gross domestic product).
8
For these statistic, see MARGIE PEDEN, THE WORLD REPORT ON ROAD TRAFFIC INJURY PREVENTION:
GETTING PUBLIC HEALTH TO DO MORE 3 (Road Safety Congress 2005).
9
Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day
Reconstruction Method, 306 SCIENCE 1776, 1777 tbl. 1 (2004).
10
See http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/releases/archives/american_community_survey_acs/
004489.html. This data includes all Americans who work outside their homes. The average two-way
commutes exceeded one hour per day in New York City, Newark, Chicago, and Riverside, California.
11
Although a few legal scholars have written in much detail about traffic law, and discussions about
no-fault accident insurance once attracted some of the academy’s leading scholars, traffic law scholarship is
presently peripheral in legal academic discourse. It is not at all clear why that should be so. Besides the
enormous number of lives and dollars at stake, traffic law remains the body of law with which ordinary
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information relevant for transportation regulation purposes is so readily available and can
be gathered quite inexpensively, yet virtually all of it presently goes to waste. Were that
information harnessed, by contrast, it might be used to save thousands of lives and push
criminal laws to the margins. In this case, the pertinent dispersed information consists of
driver reputation scores.
Among the various technologies that have facilitated the aggregation of dispersed
information, eBay’s reputation system may have generated the most global wealth so far.
We can underscore the importance of eBay’s seller reputation scores by imagining what
it would be like to buy items on eBay without them. Buyers would face the constant risk
that a seller might abscond with the proceeds of a sale, necessitating substantial
expenditures on escrow services for nearly every transaction. Even using escrow, there
would be substantial problems in the absence of seller reputation rankings. Some buyers
would discover after the fact that they had purchased counterfeit, defective, or stolen
goods, and be left with little recourse tracking down and suing far-flung sellers. Law
enforcement authorities might occasionally prosecute the worst offenders for mail fraud
or trafficking in counterfeit goods, but the vast majority of wrongdoers would escape into
the ether, taking the money of trusting buyers with them. As a result, buyers would be
scared away from dealing with obscure sellers, and the prices paid for goods on eBay
would drop substantially.12
A modern, urban freeway is a lot like eBay without reputation scores. Most
drivers on the freeway are reasonably skilled and willing to cooperate conditionally with
fellow drivers, but there is a sizable minority that imposes substantial costs on other
drivers, in the form of accidents, delays, stress, incivility, and rising insurance premiums.
Because enforcement of the traffic laws by police officers is sporadic and often targeted
toward those offenses that are easiest to prove, as opposed to those that impose the
greatest harm on motorists, insurance companies face substantial obstacles sorting among
the good drivers and the bad. As a result, safe drivers pay higher premiums, and good
Americans interact most frequently, and is the primary locus of citizens’ interactions with the police.
Moreover, traffic law is the only set of laws about which adult Americans are routinely tested, and is
probably the body of law best understood by the lay public.
12
This outcome reflects the “lemons” scenario developed in George A. Akerlof, The Market for
“Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
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drivers who are part of demographic groups that are accident-prone pay far higher
premiums than they would if insurance companies had perfect information.
Just as eBay developed a successful technological solution to the problem of
online auctions among Internet users, there are sensible and attainable technological
solutions to the problems created by motorist anonymity. These technological solutions
could produce enormous social benefits in the form of lives saved, property damage
avoided, everyday unhappiness alleviated, road rage mitigated, and law enforcement
resources redeployed.

An urban freeway contains thousands of motorists who are

watching their fellow motorists driving well or poorly, and often talking (to themselves or
passengers) about who is doing what. Harnessing this dispersed information by using
available technologies could generate great welfare gains. Can this information be put to
use?

It appears so.

The best available evidence suggests that using “How’s My

Driving?” placards on commercial vehicles substantially improves fleet safety. This
paper proposes a massive expansion of these primitive placards with the implementation
of a novel program called “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone.
Part I discusses anonymity’s central role in creating dysfunction on urban,
suburban, and exurban roadways. It discusses the existing evidence regarding How’s My
Driving programs for commercial fleets, all of which suggests that the programs
substantially reduce vehicular collisions. Part II makes the case for a universal How’s
My Driving program, whereby all drivers would be required to participate in a reputation
monitoring regime. Such a program would enable society to put scarce law enforcement
resources to better use, ensure that the forms of motorist misconduct that impose the
greatest costs on others receive the harshest sanctions, and reduce information
asymmetries in the insurance market. It could also make commuting a far less miserable
experience while reducing road rage. Part III explores the potential drawbacks associated
with a mandatory and universal How’s My Driving program. This Part assesses the
magnitude of the inaccurate or malicious feedback problem, examines the associated
driver distraction costs, considers the privacy objections, and compares the effectiveness
of How’s My Driving feedback to purely automated safe driving technologies. This Part
concludes by examining whether a mandatory, universal How’s My Driving scheme is
preferable to letting the market do as it will. Part IV discusses the many variations and
5

policy options that would arise if the government did implement a How’s My Driving for
Everyone regime. Part V considers the broader theoretical importance of the insights
derived from this case study by exploring other policy domains in which the approach of
replacing state policing with reputation tracking and decentralized enforcement could pay
dividends. It suggests that How’s My Driving-style regimes have the capacity to displace
the state’s roles in enacting and enforcing substantive laws. To that end, it ponders the
question of when such displacement is appropriate. A brief conclusion follows in Part
VI.

I.

Anonymity and Aggressive Driving
“Motorist anonymity” arises when another driver observes my behavior but is

unable to identify me as Lior Strahilevitz, as opposed to, say, some guy in a dark green
Honda Civic. The problems associated with urban and suburban driving are, by and
large, creatures of motorist anonymity. That statement may seem too bold to readers
used to hearing about drunken driving, drowsy driving, and road rage. But a review of
the literature on driving suggests that these problems stem from roadway anonymity. If
society was able to watch all its roadways around the clock, and analyze this data to
identify problematic motorists immediately and take corrective action, many of the traffic
accident deaths that occur every year would be averted.
The evidence for this linkage between anonymity and aggressive driving is
reflected in numerous studies, all of which reach essentially the same conclusion.13
People are more likely to drive aggressively when they can avoid sanctions, but drive
courteously when the believe they will be accountable for misconduct. The cleverest of
these studies find that drivers of convertibles behave more aggressively with their tops up
than their tops down,14 even though hotter weather is associated with both one’s top

13

See, e.g., Ann M. Brewer, Road Rage: What, Who, When, Where, and How?, 20 TRANSPORT REVS.
49, 55 (2000); Patricia A. Ellison et al., Anonymity and Aggressive Driving Behavior: A Field Study, 10 J.
OF SOC. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 265, 266-71 (1995); Richard Harding et al., Road Rage and the
Epidemiology of Violence: Something Old, Something New, 7 STUDIES ON CRIME & CRIME PREVENTION
221, 235-36 (1998); Rebecca Lawton & Amanda Nutter, A Comparison of Reported Levels and Expression
of Anger in Everyday and Driving Situations, 93 BRITISH J. OF PSYCH. 407, 408, 420 (2002); Leo Tasca, A
Review of the Literature on Aggressive Driving Research, working paper available in
<http://www.aggressive.drivers.com/papers/tasca/tasca.pdf>.
14
Ellison et al., supra note 13, at 266-71.
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being down and aggressive driving.15 This observational evidence is consistent with data
showing that road rage is rare in those areas where roadway anonymity is diminished,
such as small rural communities,16 and that people drive more aggressively when they are
driving alone than when there are passengers in their cars.17
The linkage between aggressive driving and negative roadway outcomes, such as
accidents, near misses, high-stress situations, and road rage, is similarly uncontroversial,
though its magnitude is the subject of some debate.18 In the most extensive literature
review to date, Galovski, Malta, and Blanchard concluded that “more than 40 years of
descriptive and experimental research studies have supported a reliable association
between aggressive driving and increased risk of motor vehicle accidents.”19 According
to the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, aggressive driving causes
approximately one-third of all motor vehicle accidents in the U.S. and two-thirds of all
domestic vehicular fatalities.20 Motorists agree that the problem is very serious, with

15

L.F. Lowenstein, Research into Causes and Manifestations of Aggression in Car Driving, 70 POLICE
J. 263, 265-66 (1997). In commuting environments where strangers interact face to face, levels of
cooperation and other-regarding behavior are higher than they are on urban freeways. See, e.g., Matthew
L. Fried & Victor J. DeFazio, Territoriality and Boundary Conflicts in the Subway, 37 PSYCH. 47, 55
(1974) (describing cooperative behavior among subway passengers).
16
CHRIS S. DULA, VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT OF A DANGEROUS DRIVING SELF-REPORT
MEASURE, PHD DISSERTATION IN PSYCHOLOGY, VA. POLYTECHNIC INST. 1 (Mar 26, 2003); Harding et al.,
supra note 13, at 225.
17
T. Rueda-Domingo et al., The Influence of Passengers on the Risk of the Driver Causing a Car
Collision in Spain: Analysis of Collisions from 1990 to 1999, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 481,
486 (2004); David Shinar & Richard Compton, Aggressive Driving : An Observation Study of Driver,
Vehicle, and Situational Variables, 36 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS AND PREVENTION 429, 433 (2004).
18
Jerry L. Deffenbacker et al., Development of a Driving Anger Scale, 74 PSYCH. REPORTS 83, 84
(1994); Frank A. Drews et al., On the Fast Lane to Road Rage, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND
INTERNATIONAL DRIVING SYMPOSIUM ON HUMAN FACTORS IN DRIVER ASSESSMENT, TRAINING AND
VEHICLE DESIGN 1 (2003); Reginald G. Smart et al, Can We Design Cars to Prevent Road Rage?, 1 INT. J.
VEHICLE INFORMATION & COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS 44, 46 (2005); Tasca, supra note 13, at 3; see also
Elizabeth M. Grey et al., Driver Aggression: The Role of Personality, Social Characteristics, Risk and
Motivation 49 (Federal Office of Road Safety Report No. CR 81 March 1989) (noting that the most
accident-free drivers tend to be compulsively non-aggressive); Louis Tijerina, Issues in the Evaluation of
Driver Distraction Associated with In-Vehicle Information and Telecommunications Systems 6, available in
<http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-13/driver-distraction/PDF/3.PDF>
(discussing
the
connection between tailgating and crashes).
19
TARA E. GALOVSKI ET AL., ROAD RAGE: ASSESSMENT AND TREATMENT OF THE ANGRY, AGGRESSIVE
DRIVER 13 (2006). The source uses “MVA” as the abbreviation for “motor vehicle accidents,” and the text
above has been changed to use the unabbreviated term.
20
Prepared Statement of the Honorable Ricardo Martinez, Administrator, National Highway Traffic
Safety Administration before the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee Surface
Transportation Subcommittee (July 17, 1997).
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survey results showing that aggressive driving is three-and-a-half times more likely than
drunk driving to be identified as the most pressing traffic safety problem.21
So far, our story is straightforward. People are prone to aggressive driving when
they feel that anonymity shields them from liability or social sanctions. This aggressive
driving, in turn, causes substantial traffic accidents and fatalities. But that is not the only
connection between roadway anonymity and adverse traffic outcomes.

A study by

Harding et al. presents the most comprehensive account of the psychology of aggressive
driving. The authors make a convincing case that aggressive behavior by anonymous
drivers triggers further aggression by those around them, who wish to sanction violations
of driving norms but feel powerless to do so in light of the anonymity of the norm
violators.22 That is, many motorists who witness bad driving or aggressive driving
become frustrated by their inability to sanction the offending motorists, and, as a result,
they often engage in retaliatory aggressive driving or, worse yet, extreme acts of
felonious road rage.23 This research suggests that the absence of a measured social
sanction for roadway norm violations can prompt extreme overreactions.

Many

aggressive drivers, on this account, are driving aggressively in an attempt “to
communicate to other road users that there are angry.”24 Yet the nature of roadway
interactions makes it difficult to express this anger in a proportional way and even more
difficult for offending drivers to express remorse unambiguously. In light of this data, we
should expect to see programs that reduce roadway anonymity substantially decreasing
aggressive driving and vehicular collusions. The best available data from the most
prominent such program strongly supports that hypothesis.

21

Shinar & Compton, supra note 17, at 429.
Harding et al., supra note 13, at 222-31.
23
Id.; see also Raymond W. Novaco, Automobile Driving and Aggressive Behavior 20 (University of
California Transp. Ctr. Working Paper No. 42 July 1991) (noting that aggressive driving and pursuit are a
common response, especially among males, when other motorists drive in an annoying manner); Sheila
Sarkar et al., Spatial and Temporal Analyses of the Variations in Aggressive Driving and Road Rage
Behaviors Observed and Reported on San Diego Freeways 6 (Calif. Instit. Transp. Safety Working Paper
2000) (arguing that road rage can result from retaliation against inattentive aggressive driving); Smart et al.,
supra note 18, at 47 (stating that obscene gestures or verbal abuse are precipitating factors in 64% of road
rage cases).
24
Lawton & Nutter, supra note 13, at 407.
22
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A.

“How’s My Driving?” for Commercial Fleets

It is likely that readers of this paper have seen bumper stickers or placards
emblazoned on the back of commercial trucks, vans, and busses asking the question:
“How’s My Driving?

Call 1-800-XXX-XXXX with compliments or complaints.”

Motorists dial these phone numbers, typically using cellular phones, to report good or bad
behavior by commercial drivers. The driver monitoring companies then make a report of
each incident, including details about the reporter’s identity, the road conditions, and the
details of the incident. This data is immediately provided to the fleet operator, which
usually investigates each incident, tracks reports about each driver, and conducts training
sessions to correct recurring problems or sanctions repeat offenders where appropriate.25
In recent years, companies that operate How’s My Driving (“HMD”) programs
have expanded their operations substantially.26

This expansion has been fueled by

various studies, mainly conducted by insurance companies, showing that the
implementation of HMD placards, along with systems for monitoring the performance of
individual drivers and investigating complaints, engender substantial reductions in
accidents and losses. Reviewing these studies, Knipling et al. reported:
Several studies, mostly by insurance providers, have researched the efficacy of using
safety placards, such as “How’s My Driving” stickers in improving safety in CMVs.
These studies have shown significant reductions in vehicle crashes, insurance
premiums, and DOT reportable crashes when fleets used safety placards with an
effective feedback loop, that is, feedback combined with training and instruction.
(Johnson 1998, The Fund 1999; STN 1999; Driver’s Alert 2002). For example, the
Hanover Insurance Co. conducted a study with 11 different trucking fleets (n = 445
trucks) using “How’s My Driving” safety placards and reported a 22% reduction in
crash rate and a 52% reduction in crash costs after 1 year.”27

25

RONALD R. KNIPLING ET AL., COMMERCIAL TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY: EFFECTIVE COMMERCIAL
TRUCK AND BUS SAFETY MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE: A SYNTHESIS OF SAFETY PRACTICE § 4.7 (2003).
26
Trebor Banstetter, How’s My Driving Calls Keep Truckers in Line, Studies Say, PALM BEACH POST,
April 20, 1999, at 1A.
27
KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 5.3.4; see also Jim Emerson, Driving Test: Hanover Ins. Co.
Uses Teleservices Monitoring to Cut Insurance Losses, DIRECT, Feb. 1, 1999, at T3, available in 1999
WLNR 5531465 (reporting results from the same Hanover study).
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Other insurance company analyses, reported in press accounts, have found similarly
substantial benefits from HMD, with Reliance Insurance Company finding that the
implementation of HMD placards was associated with a 35% reduction in crash costs in
the first year,28 and Fireman’s Fund Insurance finding a 20% reduction in accidents.29
Unpublished insurance company studies, supplied to the author by Driver’s Alert, a major
player in the HMD market, suggested similar results: A Great West Casualty Company
study of 78 trucking companies found that in the two years after they implemented HMD
programs, loss ratios improved by 51%, and accident frequency dropped by 53%.30 John
Deere Transportation Insurance’s study of 63 companies found a 45% decline in loss
ratio and a 33% decline in accidents.31 Other fleets instituting HMD programs have seen
similar improvements.32 Insurance studies of the installation of electronic monitoring
“black boxes” in commercial fleets and passenger vehicles have produced, by contrast,
20% reductions in accidents.33
These results are striking, suggesting that existing HMD programs may result in
large cost savings and prevent many injuries and deaths. That said, to the best of my
knowledge, no study of the effectiveness of HMD programs has ever appeared in a peerreviewed journal. This dearth of peer reviewed studies should prompt caution, in part
because it would be useful to know whether the insurance industry studies adequately
accounted for selection effects.34

The results of a survey suggesting that many

commercial fleet safety managers were not enamored with the effectiveness HMD
programs might prompt further skepticism, although there were real survey design
28

Banstetter, supra note 26, at 1A.
Deb Riechmann, Firms Get Good Mileage out of “How’s My Driving?”, PHILA. INQUIRER C1 (Mar.
26, 1999).
30
DRIVER’S ALERT: A VEHICLE SAFETY & INFORMATION SERVICE (unpaginated manuscript, on file
with author).
31
Id.
32
See, e.g., Joey Ledford, How’s My Driving? Draws a Response, ATLANTA J. & CONST. B5 (Dec. 24,
2001); How’s My Driving? Helps Firms Slash Accident Rates, FLEET NEWS, July 3, 1998, at 32, available
in 1998 WLNR 5732045.
33
MATTHIAS ROETTING ET AL., TRUCK DRIVERS’ ATTITUDES AND OPINIONS 4 (Liberty Mutual
Research Instit. for Safety 2004); Peter I.J. Wouters & John M.J. Bos, Traffic Accident Reduction by
Monitoring Driver Behaviour with In-Car Data Recorders, 32 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 643,
649 (2000).
34
More specifically, it may be that companies sign up for HMD programs when they are also
implementing other beneficial safety measures, or that they are likely to sign up form HMD programs after
29
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problems with this portion of the survey, which may explain that result.35 On the other
hand, those intrigued by the data presented above can take comfort that all the available
studies point in the same direction, that some sophisticated insurance companies are
willing to put their money where their mouths are by providing discounts to commercial
fleets that implement HMD programs,36 and that the market for HMD services has grown
dramatically in the last few years, both in the U.S. and abroad.37 In short, an increasing
number of businesses have been betting big on this technology in recent years, and seem
pleased with their investment. At the end of the day, then, there is reasonably strong
evidence that HMD programs produce substantial improvements in fleet safety, and the
evidence is certainly strong enough to warrant rigorous investigation by transportation
scholars.
Let us assume that the existing data reveals a causal effect, and that HMD
programs do reduce collisions and collision-related losses. To what can we attribute
these improvements in fleet safety? There appear to be two mechanisms at play. First,
the presence of these placards reminds commercial fleet drivers that they are accountable

incurring unusually large losses from accidents during a particular year and that the HMD improvements
reflect regression to the mean.
35
Whereas many safety coordinators at commercial trucking companies did not rank “How’s My
Driving placards and 800 numbers” highly as an effective safety strategy, they ranked “continuous tracking
of driver’s crashes/incidents/violations” as the third most important safety strategy (among 28 strategies).
KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at 2.2.1 tbl. 1 & tbl. 2. Tracking crashes and violations is relatively easy
for commercial fleets, but if “incidents” refers to something other than “crashes” and “violations” then the
only way to track such “incidents” would be through driver reports or motorist reports obtained from HMD.
Indeed, all HMD service providers provide both a toll-free hotline and detailed incident reports and
tracking reports for particular drivers. It therefore seems likely that the survey designers’ decision to
disaggregate HMD placards from “continuous tracking” of driver conduct resulted in the former being
ranked as less effective. Knipling et al. themselves echo a similar concern, noting forthrightly the puzzling
fact that “safety managers and other experts rated the practice of crash, incident, and violation tracking as
highly effective . . . but they did not highly value the monitoring of source safety behaviors creating these
outcomes.” Id. at § 5.3.5. An alternative explanation for the poor performance of HMD placards in the
Knipling survey is that fleet safety managers are almost always former truck drivers, id. at § 2.1, and
survey research reveals that truck drivers are typically hostile to receiving motorist feedback via HMD
numbers, though they generally welcome feedback from fellow truckers and their safety supervisors.
ROETTING ET AL., supra note 33, at 9; Yueng-Hsiang Huang et al., In Vehicle Safety Feedback,
PROFESSIONAL SAFETY 20, 24 tbl. 3, 27 (Jan. 2005).
36
Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1; see also State Encounters Problem with Plan for “How’s My
Driving?” Stickers, CHARLESTON GAZETTE & DAILY MAIL, Sep. 29, 2004, at 5A (noting that a 2002 study
by the South Carolina Governor’s Office of Fiscal Risk Analysis and Management predicted that the state
government would save $2.5 million annually by placing HMD stickers on all state vehicles).
37
See, e.g., How’s My Driving?, Nov. 2, 2005, at http://irishtrucker.com/articles/2004/april/hmd.asp

11

for behavior that is likely to annoy fellow motorists.38 Being watched acts as a deterrent
to bad acts. Second, the information obtained from HMD calls allows commercial fleets
to identify the worst drivers for extra training or dismissal.39 Typically, 80% of fleet
drivers rarely receive complaints, and 10-20% receive complaints frequently.40 This data
is consistent with other industry data showing that at most commercial trucking firms
studied, the worst 10-20% of drivers are responsible for the majority of all collisions.41 It
is also worth noting that the nature of the complaints logged by HMD companies
suggests that motorists generally call to complain about driving behaviors that are
particularly likely to lead to accidents. Driver’s Alert data classifies all its calls into one
of the following categories, and reports the frequency of calls as follows: “Speeding
(21%); tailgating (11%); unsafe lane change (23%); Illegal Passing (4%); Failure to Yield
(5%); Failure to Stop (6%); Illegal Parking (2%); Compliment (8%); Weaving (15%);
Miscellaneous (5%).”42 If most of these reports are truthful, then it is no wonder that
commercial fleet managers are able to use HMD data to identify the most accident-prone
drivers.43
B.

The Expansion of “How’s My Driving?” Programs to Automobiles

HMD programs began in the 1980s as a system for reducing commercial fleet
crashes.44 During the 1990s and in this decade, several companies began targeting a
second market niche: passenger vehicles driven by teenagers.45 The idea here is basically
the same as in the commercial context. Vehicular collisions are the leading cause of
38

KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 4.7.
Id.
40
Id. at § 5.3.4.; Emerson, supra note 27, at T3; see also Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1. (“More
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41
KNIPLING ET AL., supra note 25, at § 5.2.1.; see also Riechmann, supra note 29, at C1 (asserting that
“ninety percent of the incidents are caused by only 10 percent of the drivers”).
42
DRIVER’S ALERT, supra note 30; see also Emerson, supra note 27, at T3 (stating that the most
common complaints to HMD call centers “include tailgating, running red lights, speeding, improper lane
changes, and cutting off other drivers”).
43
Truckers Turn Toward Safety When Being Monitored, J. COMMERCE 12A (Nov. 16, 1998) (“Most
commercial drivers are good drivers, but about 10 percent to 15 percent drive aggressively -- tailgating,
weaving in and out of traffic, and speeding . . . That kind of driving causes severe crashes. And it’s also the
kind of driving that gets people annoyed enough to call the 800 number on the sticker.”).
44
Ledford, supra note 32, at B5.
45
Rex Bowman, Roanoke, Va., Business Lets Drivers Call in to Monitor Teen Performance,
RICHMOND TIMES-DISPATCH, Sept. 2, 2000; Michael Squires, New Program to Help Parents Monitor Their
Teenage Drivers, LAS VEGAS REV. J. 2B (Jan. 19, 2003); Lynn Waddell, Teen Driving: I’m Gonna Go Tell
Mom!, NEWSWEEK, May 10, 2004, at 9.
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death for American youths.46

Little wonder, then, that parents worry about their

children’s safety and the safety of nearby motorists and pedestrians. Under HMD-forteens programs, placards and bumper stickers are installed on the teenagers’ cars, and all
incident reports are conveyed directly to the parents. So far, it does not appear that the
effectiveness of these programs has been studied, although there is little reason to expect
that the results would be much different from those associated with commercial fleet
HMD programs.47 HMD programs for teens elicit information that supplements accident
reports and tickets. Parents of teens with “clean” driving records report receiving valid
critical feedback through HMD stickers, which they then use to take corrective action.48
C.

Inadequacies of Existing HMD Programs

The apparent effectiveness of HMD programs is rather surprising in light of the
following fact: Complaints flow into HMD call centers at an unimpressive rate. For
example, HMD decals on 3,000 Sysco trucks prompted only 435 incident reports to the
HMD call center during 1998.49 Data provided to the author by Driver’s Alert revealed
higher call volumes: 283 calls in a six month period for Sonic Express’s 1330 vehicles in
1999; 15 calls in the same period for Northern Beverage’s 98 vehicles; and, at the high
end, 23 calls during the six-month period for Mass Construction’s 20 vehicles.50 Yet
despite these rather low call volumes, insurance studies conducted during this era still
showed that HMD programs resulted in substantial reductions in accidents and losses.
This relative dearth of calls is not entirely surprising, given that reports to HMD
call centers are something of a public good.

Drivers have virtually no economic

incentive to complain about commercial fleet drivers whose vehicles sport HMD
46

Smart & Mann, supra note 6, at 187.
Where HMD programs have achieved little market penetration, commercial and non-commercial
drivers evidently engage in aggressive driving at approximately the same rates. Shinar & Compton, supra
note 17, at 434. Shinar and Compton reached this conclusion on the basis of a large-scale observational
study near Tel Aviv prior to 2003. Id. at 429, 430. “How’s My Driving?” stickers first appeared on Israeli
trucks and busses during 2005. Barry Newman, Steering Committee, JERUSALEM POST 4 (Dec. 8, 2005).
Parents may have fewer driver training resources at their disposal than commercial fleet companies, but
they also have few drivers to monitor, and might limit or revoke the driving privileges of teenagers whose
actions generate complaints, while rewarding those whose call logs suggest they are good drivers.
Bowman, supra note 45.
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Jean Nash Johnson, Moms Make a Web Site to Monitor Teen Drivers, ATLANTIC CITY PRESS, July
31, 2005, at G1.
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placards, and incur some costs when doing so, in the form of cell phone airtime charges
and an increased risk of a collision while reaching for the phone or a pen to facilitate an
HMD report. Using a simplistic model of homo economicus, the question is why anyone
bothers to contribute to this public good when doing so is costly.51
The same question can be asked in the eBay context, as well as in the context of
services like Wikipedia, CNET.com, Amazon’s product ratings, the Zagat Guide,
Download.com, and Tripadvisor.com.

Yet in all those contexts, an extraordinarily

valuable public good has arisen based on the voluntary contribution of feedback from
mostly anonymous or pseudonymous users. A recent study of Wikipedia, published in
Nature, found Wikipedia entries on science matters to be roughly as accurate as
Encyclopaedia Britannica’s.52 EBay is the online forum that attracts the greatest level of
participation, with feedback provided by users in half of all transactions.53

These

feedback levels are high even though transaction partners do not expect to, and probably
will not, engage in future transactions,54 and even though a buyer whose seller has
already provided favorable feedback has no incentive to provide feedback about the
seller.55 Not coincidentally, eBay is also the service where users face the lowest costs of
providing feedback. Indeed, eBay’s software encourages users to leave feedback by
reminding them of the opportunity to do so after a transaction has been completed. The
incentive to provide feedback is cast in various ways: as a civic duty, an act of
reciprocity, a common courtesy, or a chance to reward good conduct and avenge
misconduct.56 Though eBay’s reputation system is admittedly imperfect, it has been
extraordinarily successful at preventing fraud among auction participants.57
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Robert Frank has suggested that an emotional desire for vengeance often
motivates people to sanction those whose misbehavior imposes costs on others.58 If we
examine the nature of calls to HMD services, it appears that this desire for vengeance and
concern for personal and community safety are the primary factors motivating individuals
to call in complaints.59 We know from a study of San Diego’s freeways that motorists do
call the police in nontrivial numbers to complain about fellow motorists’ aggressive
driving, despite the absence of an organized program to encourage such calls and the
nonexistence of an organized effort by law enforcement to respond to these calls in a
timely manner.60 And when Maryland instituted a 1997 campaign asking motorists who
observed aggressive driving to inform the state police by dialing #77 on their cell phones,
the line received as many as 200 calls a day.61 Yet when police receive reports of
aggressive driving, they do not usually issue a citation unless they can intercept the
vehicle that sparked the complaint and observe unlawful conduct.62 It is also worth
noting that unlike eBay, which exhibits a “Pollyanna effect,” whereby feedback is overly
positive,63 HMD services elicit responses that are overwhelmingly negative.64 The lesson
here is that when it comes to driving, some people do gain welfare from sanctioning a
misbehaving driver by reporting the misconduct to a 1-800 number. We can expect that
when the costs of tattling fall, the quantity of tattling will rise.

and Assurance in E-Commerce: Privacy, Integrity, and Security at eBay, 3 TAIWAN ACCOUNTING REV. 1,
15 (2002).
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(1999).
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2000 such calls. Id. Ten percent of survey respondents in the same study reported that they have called the
police on their cell phones to report aggressive drivers in the past. Id. at 18.
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Of course, the costs of tattling are falling, substantially. In the past decade, the
number of Americans who own cell phones has skyrocketed,65 as has the prevalence of
cell phone use by motorists.66 One would predict that the increased availability of cell
phones has resulted in increased call volumes to HMD call centers, although in the last
couple of years some states have tried to curtail driver distraction by mandating the use of
hands-free devices.67

The hypothesis put forward to explain the HMD program’s

effectiveness – that it deters bad driving and allows firms to target the worst drivers for
training and/or dismissal – suggests that as call volumes increase, the effectiveness of
these programs also increases.
I shall conclude this portion of the argument with what I regard as a critical fact
that supports the hypothesis that there is a great deal of additional information about
individual drivers that currently goes to waste. It comes from an ingenious experiment
run by Andrew McGarver and Michelle Steiner.68

McGarver and Steiner set up a

controlled experiment whereby subjects, driving their own motor vehicles, believed their
speed and distance perception were being evaluated by a researcher sitting in the
passenger seat.69 In fact, the questions the researcher asked each subject were a ruse,
designed to distract the subject from the actual experimental stimulus. After several
blocks, the subject’s vehicle approached a stop sign, at which point the researcher
hesitated to provide directions about how to proceed. In the mean time, a confederate
driver approached the back of the vehicle, and began honking his horn.70

The

experimenter then measured the subject’s response to this aggressive act, which was
followed by the confederate’s vehicle rapidly passing the subject’s vehicle soon after the
subject had made a right turn at the stop sign. McGarver and Steiner found that three65

See U.S. Cell Phone Use Up More than 300 Percent, Statistical Abstract Reports, available in
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quarters of all subjects verbalized a negative response to this provocation.71 “In the
majority of cases, angered participants made negative statements about the other driver,
such as ‘what a jerk!’ or ‘this guy behind me is really ticked off!’ as well as some
common expletives.”72 This data suggests that drivers’ verbal responses to aggressive
driving are often essentially automatic. It is buttressed by survey research finding that
sizable majorities of drivers admit that while driving alone they complain aloud about the
conduct of their fellow drivers.73 Sometimes, frustrated drivers feel the need to vent by
saying something derogatory to the source of their frustration, and this venting can
escalate existing roadway conflicts.74
To recap, people are already complaining to themselves about aggressive
drivers.75 People are complaining to their passengers as well.76 And some people are
complaining to the government even when not prompted to do so.77 If only we could
develop a system that harnessed these complaints without imposing a burden on drivers
to reach for a cell phone, call an HMD number, and report the details to an operator, an
enormous amount of additional evidence would be revealed about the identities of
aggressive drivers. The public goods problem would essentially dissipate if McGarver
and Steiner’s result is generalizable.78
So let us survey this terrain. HMD placards generate rather modest per-vehicle
call volumes, and these occasional calls are evidently sufficient to improve commercial
fleets’ safety performance through some combination of deterring aggressive driving and
allowing firms to identify their worst drivers in an expeditious manner. These placards
were apparently successful even in an era in which cellular phones were far less prevalent
71
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than they are today, and even though there are monetary and safety costs associated with
reporting a driver’s misconduct to an HMD call center. It stands to reason that by
lowering the costs of reporting driver misconduct further, HMD systems could do a much
better job of identifying the worst drivers. The next section sketches out such a system.
D.

“How’s My Driving?” for Everyone

HMD placards, which began with commercial fleets, are now migrating toward
non-commercial vehicles driven by teens. Georgia required all state-owned vehicles,
with the exception of police cars, to display HMD placards in June of 2005.79 That same
year, Israel became the first nation to mandate the display of HMD placards on all
commercial vehicles.80 This expansion of HMD raises the question: Why stop there?
Why not, rather, expand HMD programs to include all motor vehicles driven in the
United States and install in each vehicle a voice activated device that facilitates the
reporting and tracking of motorist misconduct?81
Just as each new motor vehicle is required to have seat belts in order to be road
legal on Interstate highways,82 the federal government could mandate the installation of
HMD placards or bumper stickers on the front and rear of each passenger vehicle in the
United States. Each placard would provide a unique identifier for each vehicle.83 By
pressing a button on their dashboards and speaking into a steering-wheel-mounted
speaker, motorists would be able to contact a national HMD call center, and provide the

when driving alone as when driving with others. See Dula, supra note 16, at 6 (reporting a survey finding
that “77% of men and 56% of women swear underneath their breath at other drivers”).
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vehicle’s unique identifier to an operator in order to lodge compliments or complaints.84
The law would require the illumination of the placard at night and mandate its visibility
whenever the vehicle was moving. Law enforcement officials would be able to use the
unique identifiers as well, to gauge instantly whether a particular vehicle’s liability
insurance was valid, after accessing a centralized registry.
For reasons that will be discussed in Part IV, it may well be the case that an
optimal HMDFE would make use of additional new technologies, beyond placards and
call centers. A more expensive system would use in-vehicle GPS technologies or cell
phone triangulation to enable reporting without resort to a unique identifier, along the
lines of “Red Toyota behind me, subtract 2 points,” which would lower the driver
distraction costs of reporting even further and possibly reduce the probability of
erroneous reports if people misread unique identifiers. These higher-tech versions of
HMD are described more fully in Part IV, but for the time being, we can discuss the lowtech versions currently being managed by Fleetsafe, Driver’s Alert and other HMD
companies for use in commercial fleets, supplemented by readily available vehicleintegrated cell phone technologies.85
Here is how this low-tech version would work. Suppose motorist A was driving
along Interstate 5, and was suddenly cut off by motorist B, who did not signal a lane
change, and who abruptly hit his brakes, forcing motorist A to brake suddenly. Under a
How’s My Driving for Everyone (“HMDFE”) program, motorist A could contact a HMD
call center, and say the following words: “896JXD402, subtract 1 point, driver cut me off
without signaling.” Each motorist would be allotted a particular number of positive and
negative points that they could dispense to other motorists during a particular month.
These points could be dispensed one-at-a-time or cumulatively, for extreme acts of
aggression or kindness. The call center would then convert the call reports into incident
data for each vehicle on the road, possibly using automated voice recognition software.86
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Motorists would receive a monthly or quarterly invoice from the HMDFE monitoring
center, along with a bill (if negative points on their driving exceeded positive points) or a
check (if positive points substantially exceeded negative points). These would be styled
as civil fines and rewards.87
Call centers would record the phone number and name of the complainant, though
this information would not be provided to the motorist whose driving sparked this
complaint. HMDFE could be designed as a revenue neutral subsidy from bad drivers to
good drivers, or, more likely, revenue collected could be used to offset the loss of
government revenue from speeding tickets and other moving violations. Reports could
also be made available to insurers, who would be free to use the data so obtained for
premium setting purposes.
Given the apparent safety improvements associated with HMD programs, we can
conceptualize HMDFE as a vehicular safety device designed to save lives and dollars. It
is a new kind of device, however, one that harnesses the value of dispersed information
that currently goes to waste. In the part that follows, I will develop in more detail the
affirmative case for HMDFE. A few readers may be chomping at the bit to know how
HMDFE could cope with false or malicious feedback, driver distraction costs, and other
likely objections. These problems turn out to be manageable, though readers will have to
wait until Part III to hear why that is so.

II.

The Case for “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone
There is an easy way of distilling my argument in Part I of this paper, which is

that a world without HMDFE is like a world in which students evaluate their professors’
teaching, but no one ever reads or analyzes these evaluations. The students are sitting in
class each day. They form opinions about the quality of the teaching. They discuss with
classmates the quality of the teaching without prompting. In such a world, someone
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87
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should design a standardized form to solicit feedback and designate a place where
feedback forms can be deposited and tabulated. No one is saying student evaluations
should be the only measure of teaching performance. But it would be crazy to deny the
value of collecting and analyzing the data at a school where administrators care about the
quality of the educational experience. It is similarly silly to leave professors without the
accountability that student evaluations provide; many professors would still teach
conscientiously, but more than a few would not.

Yet in the driving context, the

government’s policy does nothing to facilitate the collection of this readily available
feedback, and even when motorists call in to complain about their fellow drivers anyway,
the government rarely bothers to investigate to see whether the complaints have merit.
In this part of the paper, I will suggest ways in which the driving context may be
particularly well suited to harnessing the value of dispersed information. In the process, I
will spend a fair amount of time discussing the criminal law and tort systems, which
presently regulate traffic in the United States. In some ways, it is a shame that these two
legal systems have already occupied this terrain, for HMDFE could prove to be a more
attractive regulatory regime than either one. But the existence of these two systems
hardly eliminates the need for HMDFE. Rather, we should consider HMDFE as a regime
that will allow society to substantially improve the performance of its tort system and
significantly scale back the resources presently devoted to criminal traffic enforcement.
A.

Putting Scarce Law Enforcement Resources to Better Use

It is largely because of the absence of an effective HMDFE program or other
effective reputation tracking regime that society must assign a substantial number of its
law enforcement resources to policing the roadways. In state courts, traffic violations
account for 55 percent of all incoming cases.88 Moreover, when traffic citations are
issued, and motorists decide to contest their citations, police officers must travel to traffic

88

See National Center for State Courts, 2004 Court Statistics Project: Traffic, available in
<http://www.ncsconline.org/D_Research/csp/2004_Files/EWTraffic_final_2.pdf> (visited Feb. 17, 2006).

21

court to testify and present evidence,89 which is plainly not the best use of their time, but
which follows from the criminal nature of traffic penalties.90
Needless to say, an HMDFE program would enable the government to redirect
traffic police to other endeavors where dispersed information aggregation systems would
be relatively ineffective at policing deviancy and crime. Alternatively, HMDFE would
enable state and local governments to shift resources to government programs that further
other objectives, like health care, education, or military defense. That is not to say that an
HMDFE program would allow state and local governments to do away with traffic police
altogether. Some police would still be necessary to help direct traffic around collision
sites; to ensure that drivers did not disable their vehicles’ HMD placards so as to evade
the HMDFE system; to identify and impound cars driven by uninsured drivers; and
perhaps to intervene in real time when an extremely reckless motorist’s behavior triggers
substantial numbers of reports from motorists.
Other tasks currently delegated exclusively to traffic police, like writing tickets
for motorists who drive at excessive speeds or run red lights, could be delegated entirely
to the HMDFE program. Indeed, when crashes occur, detailed police reports usually
would be unnecessary. HMDFE communications centers could expect to receive several
contemporaneous reports from other drivers who witnessed the collision, which would
help resolve blameworthiness in many cases where it might otherwise be contested, and
which would solve the chronic problem of collision underreporting, which is one of the
more severe information asymmetries currently faced by automobile insurers.
B.

Optimizing Monitoring of Roadway Violations

Police officers are little better than individual motorists in recognizing violations
of traffic rules – they have tools like radar detectors at their disposal, and perhaps

89
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enforcement function becomes a life or death matter.
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somewhat better expertise regarding those rules, but little comparative advantage beyond
that. Whatever advantage individual police officers have over individual motorists is
swamped, however, by two factors. First, the presence of a marked police car induces
motorists to change their driving behavior radically, so as to comply with the law.91
Second, police cruisers are dramatically outnumbered by other vehicles on the roadway.92
An effective HMDFE program would essentially turn every vehicle into an unmarked
police car, resulting in substantial reductions in unlawful or inconsiderate driving
behavior.
Beyond their numerical advantage, there are reasons to expect that the quality of
self-policing by motorists would exceed the quality of governmental policing. As an
initial matter it is worth examining the problems associated with the present regime.
1.

Suboptimal Police Monitoring

The bread and butter of many state and local police departments is writing
speeding tickets. Published data on traffic citations issued in the U.S., broken down by
violation type, is frustratingly rare. That said, Wisconsin is charmingly meticulous about
tracking both traffic citations and crashes, and its data suggests that citations issued for
speeding dramatically outnumber the citations issued for other dangerous driving
activities. For example, in 2003, Dane County, Wisconsin issued more than 60 times as
many speeding citations as tailgating citations.93

Indeed, speeding citations there

outnumbered the combined citations issued for tailgating, running stop signs, running red
lights, illegal turns, illegal passing, unsafe backing, unsafe lane deviations, and
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A.S. Hakkert et al., The Evaluation of Effects on Driver Behavior and Accidents of Concentrated
General Enforcement on Interurban Roads in Israel, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 43, 59-61
(2001).
92
See Cramton, supra note 89, at 435 (“There is so much driving behavior, and it is so dispersed in
time and space, that traffic police, using present methods of surveillance and enforcement, face a virtually
insurmountable task.”).
93
Calculated based on data provided at <http://www.danesheriff.com/03annual/citations.htm>. In
Ontario, Canada, speeding accounts for more than half of all traffic convictions. Donald A. Redelmeier et
al., Traffic-Law Enforcement and Risk of Death from Motor-Vehicle Crashes: A Case-Crossover Study, 361
LANCET 2177, 2179 (2003). A survey study of newly licensed teenaged drivers in northeast states found
that of their first traffic citations, 66% were for speeding, 10% were for running a red light or stop sign, and
failing to buckle up and making an illegal turn accounted for 4% of citations each. Anne T. McCartt et al.,
Driving Experience, Crashes, and Traffic Citations of Teenage Beginning Drivers, 35 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS
& PREVENTION 311, 316 (2003).
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inattentive driving by a factor of 6.6.94 Targeting those who drive at excessive speeds
may well be the optimal police strategy for raising revenue and minimizing traffic
contests, because radar guns provide relatively objective evidence of a violations. Yet
unless we make a series of unrealistic assumptions about the differential costs of
speeding and speed-limit-enforcement versus other traffic infractions, it is unlikely that
this substantial commitment of law enforcement resources to policing speed limits is the
optimal strategy for improving road safety.95 Wisconsin data, along with recent data
from other states, suggests that a failure to yield contributes to more vehicle crashes than
speeding, and tailgating contributes to slightly more accidents as well, although speeding
does contribute to more fatal crashes.96
As a result of this emphasis on speeding, other traffic laws go under enforced.
Survey data reveals that only 6.4% of motorists who admitted to running a red light
recently have ever been ticketed for the practice, and that motorists are far more likely to
have been involved in an accident where one motorist ran a red light than they are to have
received a ticket for running a red light.97

Police officers, in short, seem to be

overpolicing the motorist misconduct that is easiest to detect and underpolicing the
misconduct that leads to the most collisions.

Perhaps these distortions explain the

public’s profound resentment of traffic police, especially among U.S. drivers, who are
more aggravated by the presence of said police than they are by much of the misconduct
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that these police are supposed to deter.98 In the minds of many drivers, the cure for most
unlawful driving is worse than the disease.
An additional shortcoming associated with primary police enforcement of traffic
rules involves the entirely punitive nature of police regulation. That is to say, police
officers focus almost exclusively on punishing poor driving, and do nothing to reward
good driving.

HMDFE can supplement intrinsic rewards for cooperative roadway

99

behavior.

2.

Inadequacies of the Tort System

The criminal law system does not drive solo. The tort system deters and punishes
motorists involved in collisions as well.100 In a world with no automobile insurance and
no judgment-proof drivers, we might anticipate that the tort system would deter collisions
rather well. Of course, there would still be costs of relying on the tort system: litigation
is expensive and slow; the costs associated with the tort system will diminish its ability to
deter frequent but low-magnitude collisions; and trial outcomes are often unpredictable
because of problems of proof and other factors,101 engendering uncertainty that affects
settlements that occur in the shadow of trial outcomes.102
For related reasons, legal scholars like Bob Ellickson have hypothesized that
within close-knit groups reputation-based systems for enforcing social norms may
outperform the tort system at preventing misconduct and resolving disputes about
entitlements.103 Ellickson studied the interactions of cattle ranchers in rural California, a
98
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100
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101
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classic close-knit group, and found that in their dealings with each other they ignored the
law of trespass, replacing it with neighborliness norms that were more efficient. One can
conceptualize HMDFE as a technological fix that transforms a loose-knit group into a
close-knit group, thereby enhancing the probability that welfare-maximizing social norms
will emerge.104 We might expect that just as norms evidently outperform trespass law in
regulating cattle encroachments in rural California,105 norms might outperform tort suits
in regulating motorist behavior.
There is a critical difference between HMDFE and the type of norm enforcement
regime that Ellickson described: the heightened importance of the automobile insurance
market. Very quickly, an assessment of the tort system for regulating collisions requires
an assessment of that market.

In the automobile insurance market there are three

fundamental and well-understood problems: moral hazard, adverse selection, and
judgment-proof motorists.106 HMDFE has the potential to ameliorate each of them.
The moral hazard problem is addressed because one would not expect to see the
development of an insurance market to insure against fines that arose as a result of
HMDFE reports. Just as one cannot insure against parking tickets or moving violations,
we would not expect to see insurers viewing the HMDFE fines system as a regime that
warranted their time. The fines would be too small for most motorists and the adverse
selection problem too great to warrant entry by insurers.

So whereas automobile

insurance will reduce drivers’ safety incentives somewhat, HMDFE should not be
susceptible to the same problem.
The adverse selection problem is an information asymmetries issue. Motorists
know more about their driving skills and propensities than insurance companies do, so
104
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unsafe drivers may try to take advantage of this asymmetry by obtaining generous
insurance policies. Insurers will have a hard time distinguishing between unsafe drivers
and risk averse drivers among the ranks of those seeking generous policies, and will
expend substantial resources trying to exclude the former while insuring the latter. By
providing insurers with far more information about individual drivers’ behavior than they
currently have, HMDFE can reduce this information asymmetry, thereby causing the
insurance market to function much more efficiently.107 The section that follows will
examine the problems created by these information asymmetries in more detail.
Finally, HMDFE can address the judgment-proof defendant problem. Vehicular
accidents are expensive occurrences, easily destroying thousands of dollars in property
even if no injuries occur. Uninsured motorists may well be judgment proof with respect
to these amounts. Where injuries do occur, the costs can escalate into the hundreds of
thousands of dollars, an amount that vastly exceeds the payout limits on most drivers’
insurance policies. Many Americans will be judgment proof when such figures are
involved. Accidents, in short, are low-probability, high-cost events. HMDFE fines, by
contrast, are high-probability, low-cost events. Many motorists who would be judgment
proof with respect to tort damages, or who have insufficient income to obtain automobile
insurance, will have sufficient assets to pay HMDFE fines, and the state will be in a
strong position to collect these fines.

Thus, HMDFE stands ready to deter those

individuals, especially the uninsured, whose unsafe driving is insufficiently deterred by
the present regime.
3.

Reducing Information Asymmetries

As I suggested in the previous section, obtaining more complete information
about driver conduct could permit insurers to make more fine-grained decisions about
individual drivers’ risk profiles and eliminate pernicious actuarial practices. Insurance
107

Indeed, this information could have second-order benefits as well. The lack of information about
driving propensities becomes a problem in tort trials, heightening the risk of an erroneous judgment. If
HMDFE scores did correlate strongly with accident risks, then making HMDFE reputation scores
admissible at trial could enhance the efficiency of the tort system. Presently, however, evidence of past
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an accident survived. See 61 C.J.S. MOTOR VEHICLES § 1079. Perhaps the inadmissibility of this
information is itself connected to the sporadic nature of such data for most drivers. In that case, the less
sporadic nature of HMDFE might address these concerns.
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companies, of course, do get information about drivers from citation reports, reported
collisions, and other losses. But the data available as a result of these sources still leaves
large gaps in the system. These gaps are filled, in large measure, by resort to groupbased premium setting,108 imposing a collective sanction on all motorists who fit a
particular profile. Information asymmetries thus raise substantial distributive justice
concerns in the automobile insurance market.
Part of the problem is that, for most motorists, crashes are freakish events that
occur very infrequently.109 As a result, A’s past experience with crashes will not predict
his future likelihood of a crash particularly well.110 The problem is exacerbated by the
substantial underreporting of vehicular collisions and systematic inaccuracies in collision
reports,111 as well as the prevalence of hit and run crashes, which account for
approximately twelve percent of all collisions.112

If insurers had more data about near

misses, then future accidents could be predicted with improved accuracy113 but near
misses are rarely reported. In short, crashes occur rarely enough to render collision
history an insufficient data source for safety evaluations. If only crash data could be
supplemented with observational data, insurers could assess risks with much greater
accuracy.114
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For example, California insurers relied heavily on insured drivers’ zip codes to set automobile
insurance premiums after finding that drivers residing in certain neighborhoods were more likely to be
involved in accidents. See Michael Liedtke, Study Hits Insurance Rate Disparities, CONTRA COSTA TIMES,
Dec. 20, 2005, at F4. While insurers are prohibited by law from charging differentially on the basis of race,
a good driver who moved from a predominantly white neighborhood to a predominantly African American
neighborhood could expect to pay between $537 and $974 more for annual automobile insurance
premiums. Id.
109
Grey at al., supra note 18, at 19.
110
Tijerna, supra note 18, at 6 (noting that involvement in property damage crashes are a poor
predictor of fatal crashes); see also Baojin Wang, Safety in the Road Environment: A Driver Behavioural
Response Perspective, 29 TRANSPORTATION 253, 255 (2002) (discussing other problems associated with
using past accidents to predict future accidents).
111
A.E. af Wahlberg, Some Methodological Deficiencies in Studies on Traffic Accident Predictors, 35
ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 472, 474 (2003); M.J. Williams, Validity of the Traffic Conflicts
Technique, 13 ACCID. ANAL. & PREV. 133, 142 (1981). Even countries that mandate the reporting of all
accidents experience substantial underreporting. Jonathan Alsop & John Langley, Under-Reporting of
Motor Vehicle Traffic Crash Victims in New Zealand, 33 ACCIDENT ANALYSIS & PREVENTION 353, 354
(2001).
112
In 2003 in Wisconsin, there were 17,176 hit and run crashes and 140,265 total crashes. See
WISCONSIN DEPT OF TRANSP., 2004 WISCONSIN TRAFFIC CRASH FACTS, Ch. 2, at 21 (July 2005).
113
Tijerna, supra note 18, at 9.
114
Id. at 5.

28

Information asymmetries present particularly daunting challenges for two highrisk groups: the youngest drivers and the oldest drivers.115 Begin with the former group.
Teenagers who have just received their driver’s licenses are particularly accident prone116
and are unusually likely to tailgate other drivers.117 Yet information about teens’ driving
abilities is in short supply because they have driven so few miles, and even poor drivers
have received few citations and been involved in few crashes.118
The situation with the elderly is in many ways similar. Seniors have lengthy
driving records, but may see their driving abilities deteriorate rapidly because of slowed
reflexes, worsening eyesight, dementia, and other health problems.119 Seniors cause
approximately ¼ of all fatal collisions, and they suffer disproportionately from collisions
because of their lessened resiliency to trauma.120 Indeed, per mile driven, older drivers
are just as likely to be involved in accidents as novice drivers.121 At the same time,
seniors who retain their car keys do not drive very much,122 so information about their
driving abilities may be in short supply.

Seniors typically compensate for their

diminished driving abilities by driving more slowly. As a result, their fading driving
skills may not be reflected in increased traffic citations.123 State governments,124 health
care providers, and relatives often fail to recognize cognitive impairments in time or feel
reluctant to take the keys away from a loved one.125
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individual teens and seniors would allow insurers to sort the good drivers from the bad
more accurately.126
C.

Controlling Secondary Effects from Aggressive Driving

The foregoing discussion focused on the tangible effects of reducing aggressive
driving, as they relate to driver safety, lives saved, property damage averted, and traffic
obstructed. Quite apart from these considerations, there are a number of external benefits
that might be associated with the implementation of a HMDFE program to curtail
aggressive driving. These benefits help underscore the value of HMDFE because they
are benefits that the criminal law and tort systems do an exceedingly poor job of
promoting.
1.

Everyday Unhappiness

While the costs associated with driver deaths and injuries are quite substantial,
they may well be dwarfed by the sheer unhappiness associated with commutes to and
from work.
unhappiness.

There is reason to believe that HMDFE would alleviate much of this
By making drivers accountable, HMDFE could make driving more

pleasurable, and this effect, in and of itself, could result in enormous improvements in
human happiness.
1265, 1266-67 (2002); see also Stutts & Wilkins, supra note 119, at 431 (noting that seniors often lose self
esteem and personal freedom when they lose their driving privileges).
126
The suboptimal policing point and the information asymmetries point, in conjunction, tell us
something interesting about optimal law enforcement policy. Classic economic approaches to crime
assume that society should set the penalty for a crime so as to make the crime’s costs (to the criminal)
exceed its benefits (to the criminal). See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 242 (5th ed.
1998); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-77
(1968). If existing penalties prove inadequate, resulting in too much crime, society can respond by raising
the likelihood of apprehension or raising the penalty for those caught. In theory, the state will be
indifferent as between these two strategies. In practice, given the costs associated with raising the
likelihood of detection, classic law-and-economics analysis often points in the direction of ramping up
penalties instead of increasing the risk of apprehension. See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION
TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 78 (2d ed. 1989); Bruce L. Hay, Fee Awards and Optimal Deterrence, 71 CHI.KENT. L. REV. 505, 507 (1995). But where we have a vibrant insurance market in place whose premiumsetting strategies piggyback on information generated by criminal enforcement actions, society should
prefer law enforcement strategies that raise the likelihood of detection. Rare but severe state punishments
will leave insurers in the dark about most of their customers’ driving attributes and may wipe out those
whose misdeeds are detected by law enforcement, rendering unlucky wrongdoers indifferent to the
marginal effects of increased insurance premiums. Frequent but measured sanctions for misconduct, by
contrast, will allow insurers to sort among safe and unsafe citizens more effectively. In those areas, like
traffic enforcement, where a robust insurance market exists and where the state relies on sporadic
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In recent years economists have begun exploring the value of happiness.
Experimental work by Daniel Kahneman and coauthors has prompted research subjects
to assess their state of well being when performing various daily life tasks.127 The
researchers used a large sample of working women and a day reconstruction method,
whereby the subjects would record diaries at the end of each day detailing their activities
and how they felt while doing them.128 The study separated out sixteen major life
activities and ranked them in order of how happy people felt doing them. Commuting to
work ranked dead last, noticeably below the two next least popular activities of
housework and working.129
130

commuting.

The average subject spent 1.6 unhappy hours per day

We know from other research that the vast majority of this time was spent

alone, in their cars.131
Commuters, then, are a rather miserable lot. Why so glum? This is not a question
that Kahneman and his co-authors asked, but there is data on this question from
transportation scholars, all of which blames rudeness and aggressive driving. When
Porter and Berry surveyed frustrated drivers in a 2001 paper and asked them what was
the most important cause of their frustration, driver rudeness won in a landslide. Fully
43.5% of respondents stated that “discourteous drivers” was the greatest source of
frustration, versus 20.8% who identified “congestion,” 12.7% who identified “drivers not
following the law,” 4% who stated “too many stop lights,” and 1% who complained most
about the length of their commute.132 This data echoed findings by other researchers,133
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and there is a psychological literature connecting road rage and vehicular collisions to
clinical depression and post-traumatic stress disorder.134

If we put together the

Kahneman research with the transportation survey research, we very quickly arrive at the
conclusion that aggressive driving is the source of substantial disutility that Americans
encounter in they day-to-day lives. This disutility leads to collisions,135 to be sure, but a
useful result of the happiness research is to show that even if aggressive driving did not
lead to any additional collisions, it would still be a substantial social ill worth addressing
through public policy interventions.
2.

Expressive Benefits

Standard approaches to criminal law assume that enforcing the law is an
undesirable activity that the state’s agents (police officers) must be paid to do. The
limited data available from HMD programs, along with the data from governmental pilot
programs designed to elicit information about aggressive driving, suggests that there is a
substantial portion of the civilian population that is willing to tattle on unsafe and
discourteous drivers, even if doing so entails some financial costs and no financial
benefits.
The present approach to traffic regulation ignores the “consumer surplus” that
would be associated with enabling lay people to express their opinions about fellow
drivers to punish bad drivers and reward good drivers. But these expressive benefits
ought to be an important part of the calculus, and not only because expressing these
opinions might alleviate the frustration that sometimes engenders aggressive driving or
road rage. Rather, they seem to produce genuine welfare gains for the drivers who feel
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impotent and stifled under the status quo but whose complaints would be taken seriously
under a HMDFE regime.136 The effects of law enforcement on the enforcers, in short,
can be just as important as the effects on enforcees.

III.

Objections to “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone
Having made out what I believe to be a rather strong affirmative case for

HMDFE, I shall now proceed to discuss some of the serious objections that no doubt
have occurred to readers. Several of these objections have merit, although I shall suggest
that, even in combination, they do not offset the advantages detailed above. Moreover, a
few of the arguments that at first glance look like objections ultimately may strengthen
the case for implementing HMDFE.
A.

Inaccurate and Malicious Feedback

A HMDFE system is only as good as the feedback it receives, so it is worth
examining the anticipated accuracy of said feedback. We can identify two quite different
problems here: First, deliberately inaccurate (positive or negative) feedback, and second,
feedback provided in good faith that turns out to be mistaken. The former issue presents
greater challenges, and should be treated at length.
It is rather easy to imagine scenarios whereby HMDFE systems could be abused.
Let us bring the most troublesome scenarios to the forefront. Suppose a racist driver
cruises around town, assigning negative feedback to African American or Asian
American motorists who are driving in an acceptable manner. Alternatively, imagine that
HMDFE feedback is used as part of a harassment campaign against an unpopular
individual for reasons having nothing to do with her driving performance. There is no
doubt that if HMDFE is implemented, this type of distasteful conduct will occur, as will
occasional inaccurately positive feedback. That said, there is reason to believe that such
misconduct will be rare, that technology can ameliorate such problems when they do
arise, and that the problems associated with biased drivers would be no worse than the
problems created by biased cops in the current police-based traffic enforcement regime.
136

Frustrated drivers often express their frustration and anger by honking their horns. This is an
unsatisfying response, in that it imposes few costs on the source of the driver’s frustration, and it also
engenders substantial noise pollution externalities.
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Commercial fleet drivers sometimes object to HMD programs based on a fear that
callers will phone in false reports.137 Yet it turns out that inaccurate reporting for
commercial fleet drivers are uncommon in HMD programs, and anonymous reports
generally are not permitted, although the identity of callers is not reported to the
offending drivers.138 Rather, the pattern of calls to HMD call centers suggests that the
concern about false reports are overblown. A small minority of drivers prompt the
majority of calls, and after these drivers are identified for retraining or discharge, fleet
accident rates drop sharply.139

This evidence cannot be reconciled easily with the

hypothesis that many HMD calls are motivated by racial animus, harassment, or pranks.
To be sure, drivers of passenger vehicles might be more susceptible to malicious reports
thanks to the greater proximity of the driver to his or her rear bumper, and women and
minorities may be underrepresented in the ranks of commercial drivers. Still, while one
might expect to see more prejudiced feedback in HMDFE than HMD for commercial
vehicles, there is little reason to expect a plethora of false reports in the HMDFE context.
The phenomenon of false feedback is a concern that arises in online reputation
regimes, and software developers, as well as economists, have developed algorithms that
can detect deliberately false feedback. Essentially, the idea is that the system discounts
outlier scores – instances in which a buyer gives negative feedback on an
overwhelmingly well-rated merchant or vise versa.140 There is a cost to eliminating these
outliers, in that a good merchant sometimes behaves badly, just as a good driver
sometimes makes mistakes.141 That said, in an environment like eBay, where most users
are behaving honestly, algorithms designed to weed out likely false reports are welfare
enhancing.142

Moreover, it is worth emphasizing that online reputation tracking
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technologies are still in their infancy, and dramatic improvements to the eBay system for
identifying false feedback can be expected in the years ahead.143
These algorithms could be adapted to the HMDFE regime quite readily. Indeed,
by gaining more information about drivers than eBay has about buyers and sellers, the
system could police racist and other forms of problematic feedback quite effectively. For
example, if a HMDFE system knows the race of various drivers, it can discount or ignore
entirely the ratings of white drivers who routinely assign suspiciously high levels of
negative feedback to African American drivers. Similarly, if the system knows where
people work, study, and live, it can discount or ignore feedback among people who live
in the same household, attend the same high school, or who work for the same
company.144 Moreover, the system can discount repeat evaluations among the same
drivers. In an urban environment, if one driver or a group of drivers are repeatedly giving
positive or negative feedback to another driver, there is probably something fishy going
on, and the system can ignore these suspicious rankings.145 In other words, so long as we
are willing to seed a HMDFE system with information about characteristics that might
form the basis for inaccurate feedback, the use of algorithms can more effectively
ameliorate the problems associated with deliberate inaccuracy.
In some respects, HMDFE would be better equipped to deal with malicious
feedback than the online reputation sites.

Online reputation sites suffer somewhat

because users with poor reputations can always “flush” their existing identities and start
over with a blank slate.146 A HMDFE would use each participant’s unique identifier
(vehicle VIN numbers and / or driver’s license numbers) to prevent these sorts of
evasions. A well-designed HMDFE system, in short, ought to be able to ameliorate the
problems with malicious feedback. Like Wikipedia, eBay, and open source projects, it
143
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will not be able to eliminate malicious information entirely. But algorithms, combined
with driver information from motorist reports, pre-existing government records, and
third-party databases, provide a promising substitute for Wikipedia’s voting system,
eBay’s fraud patrols, and open source filtering mechanisms.147
One additional point is worth emphasizing on this score. It is not appropriate to
compare a HMDFE regime with occasional inaccurate reporting to an ideal system of
police enforcement of traffic laws. Police enforcement in the real world is distinctly not
first-best. Police officers are prone to the same biases as other people,148 and training to
correct for those biases is imperfect.

Delegating traffic enforcement to drivers

themselves is a nice way of ensuring that traffic enforcers reflect the demographics of the
surrounding communities.
What about feedback that the caller believes to be true, but that turns out not to be
accurate? On the whole, the experience of companies using HMD programs and the
experimental research on driving attitudes suggests that the signal-to-noise ratio from
HMDFE would be comfortingly high. There is, admittedly, some evidence to suggest
that individuals may rely on stereotypes to generate their opinions of what contributed to
a particular collision. After presenting research subjects with written descriptions of
accidents and asking them to assign blame, Lawrence and Richardson found that gender
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and car type significantly affected these judgments.149 More specifically, male drivers
were judged to be more aggressive (a stereotype that is consistent with other data),150 and
female drivers were judged to be more careless (a stereotype that is not supported by
other data).151

Similarly, BMW drivers were judged more likely to have behaved

aggressively than drivers of tiny Smartcars (a stereotype that is consistent with some, but
not all, of the other data).152 In laboratory settings, then, people are influenced by
external factors in designating other drivers as blameworthy.
In real-world settings, where aggressive driving often provokes visceral
responses, these biases tend to fade into the background. For example, the intensity of
driver reactions and the length of their verbal response did not differ when they were
confronted by honking low-status or high-status vehicles on the roadway, although
research subjects did accelerate more quickly to get away from honking drivers of lowstatus vehicles.153 This suggests that the data produced by a HMDFE data will not
perfectly reflect what actually happens on the roadways, but it should reflect it well
enough to cause the system to operate reasonably well. Indeed, other feedback systems,
such as eBay’s, should be susceptible to some of the same biases, based on seller names
and existing reputation, and yet those feedback systems are generally hailed as major
successes. Moreover, keeping in mind the relevant comparison is again useful here.
Police officers will hold many of the same subconscious biases,154 and these biases may
149
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be more problematic in the officer context because resource constraints require high
levels of selective enforcement on the roadways.
B.

Distracted Driving

By enabling drivers to complain about others’ misconduct, a HMDFE regime
might distract them from their first priority, which is to operate a motor vehicle safely.155
In the last few years, as cell phones have proliferated, policymakers and researchers have
devoted increased attention to the risks associated with driver distraction. Some of these
concerns have prompted state legislatures to require drivers to use hands-free cell phone
devices, although no U.S. jurisdiction has banned calling while driving altogether.156 The
best available evidence suggests that conversing on a cell phone increases collision risk
marginally, perhaps not by enough to warrant regulation in light of the productivity gains
associated with the in-vehicle use of communications devices.157
An impressive study by Wilson, Fang, Wiggins & Cooper combined observation
of cell phone use on public roadways with research into the driving records and collision
histories of those seen using cell phones versus those seen not using cell phones. Their
study found that drivers “observed using a cell phone had a risk of an at-fault crash 1.16
times greater than did drivers not using cell phones.”158 For males, the relationship
between observed cell phone use and collisions was not statistically significant, though it
was significant for females.159 By contrast, having previously incurred a citation for
aggressive driving multiplied the likelihood of collision involvement by 1.84 for all
drivers and by 1.76 for males.160 Being aged 16-24 enhanced the likelihood of collision
involvement by factors of 1.74 for all drivers and 1.99 for males, and being 25-34
multiplied the likelihood of collision involvement by 1.53 for all drivers and 1.6 for
155
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males.161 For all drivers, the increased risk associated with being a cell phone user was
essentially equal to the increased risk associated with being aged 35-44 (as opposed to 45
or older).162 Wilson and co-authors did note that cell phone use was associated with
other-high risk behaviors that enhanced collision risk, but a multivariate regression
analysis revealed that cell phone use’s role in enhancing collision risk was “relatively
minor.”163 Equally important, the very high collision risk associated with aggressive
driving violations (despite the rarity with which these violations were detected) makes it
plausible that the increased collision risk associated with encouraging HMD cell phone
reports would be dwarfed by the decreased collision risk associated with detecting and
deterring aggressive driving.164
Another comprehensive study of Virginia traffic accidents analyzed the various
causes of crash-related driver distraction.165 The researchers found that cell phone use
did contribute to some traffic accidents, but that it ranked well below looking at scenery,
rubbernecking, and eating and drinking as a contributor to collisions.166 Cell phone use
ranked slightly above adjusting vehicle controls as a contributor to traffic accidents.167
On the whole, the research findings suggested that cell phone use did cause some
accidents, but far fewer accidents than other manifestations of driver distraction that
currently go unregulated. Moreover, if it is true that HMDFE would decrease collisions
by deterring aggressive driving and helping to remove the worst drivers from the roads,
then this would generate substantial benefits from a driver distraction perspective, since
rubbernecking is such an important contributor to crashes. Fewer accidents leads to less
distraction, which results in fewer accidents. And so on. Other research suggested that
two aspects of cell phone use are dangerous while driving: manipulating a phone (e.g.,

161

Id.
Id. at 49 tbl. 3.
163
Id. at 51.
164
It is plausible that the correlation between crashes and aggressive driving violations is so high, at
least in part, because aggressive driving violations are so rare. That is to say, we can expect that the drivers
who have received citations will tend to be the most aggressive drivers, as opposed to the moderately
aggressive drivers.
165
Andrea L. Glaze & James M. Ellis, Pilot Study of Distracted Drivers (Survey and Evaluation
Research Laboratory, Center for Public Policy, Virginia Commonwealth Univ. Jan. 2003).
166
Id. at 13-14.
167
Id.
162

39

dialing numbers while driving), and engaging in intense conversations that demand a
great deal of attention, focus, and computational brainpower.168
There are studies that reach very different conclusions, lending a note of caution
to these conclusions about cell phone usage and collisions, although some of these studies
do not control for the observed correlation between cell phone use and other risky driving
behaviors.169 If these studies are to be believed, then cell phone usage may result in
moderate, or even major, increases in collision risk. In that case, even short duration
calls to HMD centers could result in measurable increases in collision nationwide.
In light of this research suggesting that cell phone use probably increases collision
risk mildly to moderately, three points are worth making. The first point is that voice
recognition and other technologies stand poised to decrease the impairments associated
with cell phone use while driving.170 The second point is that even if cell phone use as
such does increase accident risk, the incremental increase in cell phone use resulting from
the implementation of a HMDFE program would be rather small. After all, motorists will
spend far more time talking to friends, relatives, clients, and services providers than they
will spend talking to HMD operators, even in a 1-800-based HMDFE system. Moreover,
reports called into an HMD system can be used to identify those callers whose use of invehicle communications adversely affects their driving performance.
168
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The third point is the key. As the studies referenced above make plain, cell phone
use is hardly the most significant source of driver distraction. Indeed, other research
suggests that the frustration associated with seeing other drivers behave rudely or
aggressively is very substantial, and that this frustration is itself a source of distraction.171
So while a HMDFE system would increase the distraction associated with reporting
others’ misconduct, it promises to alleviate the distraction that arises from fuming about
another’s driving and either feeling powerless to do anything about it, or contemplating
some means of retaliating against the offending driver.172

And, of course, when

retaliation does occur, via light flashing, honking, gesturing, and the like, the result may
be the distraction of two drivers – both the initial offender and the frustrated retaliator.
In short, in order to determine the net driver distraction effects of HMDFE, we
would need to balance the incremental danger of distraction by callers against the
incremental danger of driver frustration resulting from an inability to report bad driving.
Seen in that light, it may be that the net effect of a HMDFE system would be a decrease
in driver distraction, notwithstanding the enhanced use of telecommunications devices
required in order to log complaints.
C.

Privacy Interests

Privacy advocates occasionally sound the alarm about automated enforcement
regimes in the driving context, whereby rental car companies or insurance companies
monitor individual drivers’ behavior through the use of GPS or other surveillance
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technologies.173

When discussions involve sharing such information with the

government, these same privacy advocates are quick to invoke George Orwell’s 1984.174
I teach and write about privacy law,175 but I have difficulty understanding the
appeal of these kinds of claims. I can comprehend the individual privacy interest in
travel destinations and why 24-hour GPS monitoring of a vehicle might intrude on a
legitimate privacy interest. After all, 24-hour monitoring of that sort would allow the
monitor to infer a great deal about the driver’s intimate associations, medical information,
and political activities. But we can remedy these concerns by forbidding monitoring
entities from piecing together information about drivers’ travel patterns and by protecting
vigilantly the HMDFE databases that would contain information that reveals these
patterns. If we focus our attention on technologies that allow governments or insurers to
discover a motorist’s speed or braking distance, the privacy interests would seem to
disappear. There is nothing private about road speed: It can be discerned with substantial
accuracy by a police officer, a bystander holding a radar gun, or a motorist driving behind
the car being monitored. There is no connection between road speed, or propensity to
tailgate, and intimate conduct of any kind.176 Nor do these bits of information implicate
our interests in facilitating the development of personalities, affect sensitive medical
information, or undermine valuable confidential relationships. Privacy is a means, not an
end.177 We should protect privacy if, and only if, doing so promotes social welfare. It is
difficult to identify such a benefit to roadway anonymity with respect to behaviors like
road speed, weaving through traffic, and cutting off other motorists.
Driving usually takes place in very public places. Almost everything that could
be learned through the implementation of a HMDFE regime could be learned through
multiplying the present number of traffic police by a factor of ten. Yet virtually no one
173
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contends that increasing the number of police officers patrolling the streets would violate
individual privacy rights.178 HMDFE makes drivers accountable for conduct that is
public and obscure solely because of resource constraints. The only time an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to her driving is when hers is the
only car on the roadways. In those settings, HMDFE would protect the privacy of her
conduct, because there would be no one around to report any good or bad driving. The
privacy objection to HMDFE, in short, is a non-starter.
D.

Why Not Fully Automated Enforcement?

In recent years, traffic planners have become increasingly enamored with
automated means for improving traffic flow and safety. Various technologies are being
developed by research and development departments at car manufacturers and in
engineering faculties. For example, cars are being developed that will use radar to detect
instances in which a driver is tailgating another vehicle too closely;179 intersections are
being fitted with cameras to catch motorists who drive through red lights;180 and
insurance companies as well as rental car companies and commercial fleets are testing the
use of GPS to monitor speeding by individual drivers.181 Many of these approaches hold
promise, and research into these programs can proceed alongside the roll-out of
HMDFE.182 Indeed, because automated systems might provide an objective means of
corroborating some of the information reported to HMD centers, these systems could
enable researchers to spot-check the accuracy of the information aggregated via HMDFE.
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It is certainly possible that the implementation of HMDFE would curtail the
development of technologies designed to promote safer driving. That said, the case for
HMDFE over automated enforcement is the case for human judgment and context
sensitivity. Driving in excess of the speed limit is efficient in some contexts, whereas in
other contexts (such as on an icy road), driving at the speed limit exposes other drivers to
substantial risks.183 Indeed, on a clear and sunny day, when most drivers are doing 70
miles per hour in a 55 mile per hour zone, driving at the speed limit is more dangerous
than driving 70 miles per hour.184 Running a red light at three o’clock in the morning at a
deserted intersection is sensible; ticketing a driver for engaging in such context serves
little purpose other than to prompt exasperation with the traffic laws. Some forms of bad
driving, such as excessive lane changing or a refusal to let another motorist merge, are
difficult to detect via automated enforcement.

Other harmful driving habits, like

excessive braking or darting into a parking spot that another motorist is plainly waiting
for, are not generally unlawful.

Finally, as has been discussed above, automated

enforcement offers none of the expressive benefits associated with HMDFE, whereby the
regime encourages measured and anonymous retaliation for driver misconduct, thereby
diverting frustrated motorists from more excessive and provocative retaliation.
One comparative advantage of HMDFE, as opposed to automated traffic
enforcement is quite similar to the comparative advantage of HMDFE over traffic
police’s enforcement of rules. It is based on a preference for standards and norms over
rules and laws. There is a standard-like exception to virtually every “rule” of the road.
Americans drive on the right, except when the right lane is obstructed, in which case they
try to move into the left lane when it is safe to do so. Americans must not run red lights,
except when it is necessary to do so in order to avoid an accident or get out of the way of
an emergency vehicle. Moreover, much of what makes a driving environment pleasant
and safe manifests as manners that do not lend themselves to rule-based-enforcement via
technology or police officers who must justify their decisions if challenged. HMDFE is,
in short, like a jury system for traffic regulation, where existing laws and rules are
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modified by social expectations and aspirations to form a body of law that is used to
reward the cooperators and punish the deviants.185
E.

Shouldn’t We Let the Market Implement HMD on Its Own?

In order to justify a mandatory regulatory intervention, it is usually appropriate to
identify a market failure that needs fixing. At the outset, it is worth recalling that the
absence of an effective market on the roadway is the source of the aggressive driving
problem in the first place. We need not develop a comprehensive reputation tracking
system in instances where vendors who behave poorly suffer the repercussions. If a
Starbucks barista is rude, customers can complain to the shop manager, and since the
manager has an incentive to keep his customers happy, he will train the employee to
behave better or fire her if training seems futile. In the driving context, there is no market
that binds one driver to another, and this absence of a market both creates the need for
governmental involvement, via the traffic police and tort system, and opens up the
possibility for a HMDFE system to displace government regulation with distributed
enforcement.
That said, there are major players in the driving market who in some respects
resemble our Starbucks managers.

Automobile insurance firms, in theory, could

discipline poor drivers whose policies they underwrite, but at present there is no
institution that allows a frustrated motorist to identify which insurance company to call in
order to complain about the pick-up truck driver who nearly rear-ended him. Insurance
companies are certainly free to make it worth their customers’ while to participate in a
HMD scheme, and given the mandate in all 50-states that every motorist carry liability
insurance, one might expect to see high levels of participation in a purely voluntary HMD
scheme. This raises the question of why government mandates are appropriate here.
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The first answer is that a non-universal system would mitigate the expressive benefits
associated with HMDFE. More precisely, a HMDFE taps into norms of reciprocity
whereby motorist A tolerates the possibility that other drivers may punish his own poor
driving by virtue of his own ability to punish others’ poor driving in exchange.186 Given
the strong possibility that the least considerate drivers will be most likely to opt out of a
voluntary HMD program, these expressive benefits will be lost, and these holes in system
coverage might invite road rage and aggressive retaliation against those who have opted
out, while simultaneously undermining support for the system as a whole.
The second answer is that there are millions of drivers who do not have automobile
insurance,187 and a voluntary HMD regime would not incorporate these drivers into the
system. At present, it is rather difficult for police to discover that a particular motorist is
uninsured. A HMDFE system could enable law enforcement to detect these vehicles
more easily, by making it possible to determine quickly whether a vehicle is insured
based on evidence that can be accessed from the exterior of the car.188 As noted above,
with HMDFE, a (reduced) number of traffic police would still be required to ensure that
every motorist is participating faithfully in the system, and this could be accomplished
through a combination of random checks in traffic and the targeting of vehicles that had
been the subject of HMD reports but that did not show up as carrying liability insurance
in a centralized HMD database. Creating an HMD database would substantially reduce
the marginal costs of including insurance information in the database.
The third answer is that there are negative externalities associated with aggressive or
inappropriate driving that are not borne by individual insurance companies. Automobile
insurance companies do internalize many of the harms of increased collisions, but not the
186
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health and psychological costs associated with frustrated and angry drivers, the rising
vehicle and fossil fuel costs associated with increased expenditures on bigger and safer
cars, and the law enforcement costs associated with policing traffic violations. These are
costs born by the public at large and the state, and they may explain the failure of
insurance companies to encourage the expansion of HMD beyond commercial fleets.
Moreover, while individual insurance companies would benefit from having feedback
about their own customers, they would not benefit (much) from enabling their customers
to leave feedback about other insurance companies’ customers. Hence, the provision of
feedback-enabling technologies in vehicles would be plagued by a minor tragedy of the
commons, which might well prevent insurers from encouraging the installation of these
devices in vehicles driven by their customers.
Finally, it is worth invoking paternalist rationales in support of mandatory
HMDFE. When it comes to driving, commercial and non-commercial drivers alike
deviate rather substantially from what a rational actor model would predict, with
cognitive errors and emotional responses adversely affecting driver performance.189 The
predominant government attitude toward seat belts in the 1970s was that individuals
could decide for themselves whether they wished to use these safety devices. Most
consumers did buckle up, but thousands refused to do so and died as a consequence. If
studies of HMD in the commercial fleet context translate into the passenger vehicle
context, then the argument for HMDFE would look a lot like the argument for click-it or
ticket laws. Forcing the universal use of a safety device saves enough lives to warrant the
associated restrictions on individual liberty. Indeed, the case for HMDFE is rather
stronger, in that HMDFE is designed primarily to control the externalities associated with
driving, whereas mandatory seat belt laws were designed primarily to protect against
internalized harms.
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On balance then, it seems that HMD would be most effective if implemented
universally, and the government’s ability to mandate participation make it the obvious
vessel for implementing HMDFE. There is, of course, a doctrinal glitch associated with
such an approach: the Due Process Clause. In the sense that the federal government
would be deputizing its motorists and enabling any of them to sanction fellow motorists,
the program would be unprecedented. The state often encourages private citizens to blow
the whistle about others’ misconduct, via qui tam statutes, whistleblower protections, and
signs encouraging motorists to “Be an HOV Hero: Report Carpool Cheats.” But these
complaints typically trigger government investigations where the accused are entitled to a
presumption of innocence.
At the same time, there are numerous examples of instances in which the
government delegates high-stakes decisions about individuals to the community. Does an
advertising campaign infringe a registered trademark?

It depends on the extent of

associated consumer confusion. Can sexually explicit speech be suppressed? Will vice
laws be enforced? The answer usually depends on whether citizens of the affected
neighborhoods demand enforcement. That depends in part on whether it is obscene under
community standards. The interesting question raised by HMDFE is “What happens
when the stakes of a sanction are much lower and the costs of permitting each motorist to
challenge any sanction in court or administrative proceedings would be prohibitive?” To
answer such a question the law would have to fall back on a general balancing approach,
along the lines of Mathews v. Eldridge.190 Mathews suggests that bare-bones procedures
may be constitutionally sufficient if they result in reasonably reliable decisions about
sufficiently low-stakes matters.191 This analysis suggests that a great deal will turn on the
magnitude of the inaccurate feedback problem identified above.192 To the extent that the
version of HMDFE proposed so far would be insufficiently accurate under Mathews, the
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part that follows explores some costlier variations that would almost certainly satisfy the
Mathews test.
F.

Cost-Benefit Analysis

The ultimate test of HMDFE will be whether it withstands cost-benefit analysis.
The preceding sections have identified the relative costs and benefits, and it will be
helpful to recount them briefly here. Of course, with a new and admittedly radical
proposal like this one, it will be impossible to generate any reliable estimates of the actual
dollar figures on either the cost or benefit sides.
With respect to benefits, we would be aggregating the value of collisions avoided,
including lives saved, injuries prevented, work interruptions avoided, litigation and
insurance administration costs eliminated, and property damage averted. Data on HMD
for commercial vehicles suggests that collision reductions could range from 20% to
50%.193 A recent economic analysis found that the mean social cost of a fatal traffic
accident in the developed world was approximately $1.5 million in 1999.194 Other recent
estimates suggest that fatal traffic accidents alone cost the United States 2.2% of its Gross
Domestic Product (GDP).195 Using the Bureau of Economic Analysis’s 2005 estimate of
$12.76 trillion for GDP,196 the cost of such accidents in the United States equaled
$280.73 billion. A 20% reduction in fatal crashes therefore would save society upwards
of $56 billion per year, based on these conservative, back-of-the-envelope calculations.
Other benefits identified in this paper would include cost savings on law enforcement,
enhanced efficiencies from reduced information asymmetries in the insurance market,
substantial improvements in everyday driver happiness, and substantial expressive
benefits from enabling drivers to sanction those who endanger or frustrate fellow
motorists.
On the costs side, we should include the costs associated with establishing a
HMDFE system, the costs of malicious and inaccurate feedback, and the costs incurred
193
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by those motorists who would suffer disutility from having their driver behavior
adversely evaluated by peers.

There would also be some driver distraction costs

associated with HMDFE. However, these distraction costs would be offset (perhaps
fully) by a reduction in two forms of driver distraction: distraction caused by an inability
to sanction an aggressive driver in a measured way, and distraction caused by reduced
rubbernecking.
In short, the costs and benefits of HMDFE are presently indeterminate and will
remain so until a pilot program is implemented or further experimental studies are
conducted.

That said, it seems entirely plausible that the benefits associated with

HMDFE will outweigh the associated costs, perhaps by a wide margin.

IV.

Variations
My goal in this paper has been to construct a conceptual case for distributed

enforcement of traffic norms. I have no intention of hashing out all the details of what
the ideal HMDFE system would look like. After all, for the reasons identified above,
implementing any HMDFE regime would induce a great many changes in the way we
think about traffic regulation, and different portfolios of changes are likely to appeal to
different readers. Along the same lines, any HMDFE regime necessarily confronts some
basic tradeoffs, and the ways in which policymakers weigh those tradeoffs should affect
the parameters of such a system. For example, there will be a tradeoff between the costs
of a HMDFE system and its effectiveness in generating accurate data. So policymakers
in jurisdictions facing major resource constraints might opt for a less accurate system,
and policymakers in jurisdictions where collisions impose particularly serious costs on
society may be willing to stomach a higher tech version of HMDFE. This part of the
paper identifies the more important tradeoffs and evaluates possible variations on the
HMDFE regime.
A.

High Tech Reporting

The rudimentary version of HMDFE relies on technologies that already exist and
have proven themselves in the context of voluntary HMD programs for commercial
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fleets: stickers or placards on the backs of vehicles encouraging motorists to report
misconduct via their cell phones. That said, placards and cell phones should strike us as
stone age technologies in 2006. Requiring motorists to see a placard clearly, pay for cell
phone calls, and report good or bad behavior to an operator will surely deter some
reporting and thereby keep much useful data out of the system. So technologies that can
reduce these reporting costs seem particularly valuable in the context of a HMDFE
regime. A slightly higher technology version of the system would lower the cost of
reporting good or bad driving by installing dedicated communications technologies
within vehicles for the sole purpose of contacting HMD call centers. Motorists could
contact these call centers by pressing a button on their steering wheels and by
commenting on others’ driving using a built-in speaker. We can dub this version the
“On-Star” approach.197
But with a little bit of ambition, we can imagine a much more effective HMDFE
system, using technologies that already exist, but that have not been adapted for the
purposes of reporting bad or good driving. This could be accomplished by mandating the
installation of GPS trackers in every vehicle or using cell phone tower triangulation to
identify the locations of particular motorists. Such positional data would allow drivers to
report on each other’s driving even if they could not see a placard. For example, a driver
might contact the call center to report, “Blue convertible behind me, add three points,
kindly let me merge.” Relying on voice recognition software to turn this report into
binary code instantaneously,198 the HMD call center would then use GPS to discover the
location of the caller’s vehicle as well as the unique identifier belonging to the vehicle
immediately behind his, assigning that vehicle three driving points after verifying that it
was a blue convertible. Indeed, if the vehicle behind the driver at that moment was no
longer a blue convertible, the automated call center could locate any blue convertible
within a few car lengths of the caller’s vehicle and assign that car the points in question.
In principle, such a system also could be designed to facilitate reporting by pedestrians,
bicyclists, and bus passengers, particularly as GPS-enabled hand held devices become
increasingly common in the coming years. Analyzing the various engineering challenges
197
198
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inherent in developing such a system is well outside my zone of expertise. I will merely
refer interested readers to some of the more illuminating papers in the burgeoning
literatures on the use of GPS devices in driving,199 wireless communications systems in
vehicles,200 and voice recognition devices in automobiles.201
A different type of high-tech reporting can address the aforementioned inaccurate
feedback problem as well. It would be relatively easy to mount digital video cameras on
the front and rear of all participating vehicles, and in-car computers could upload the
video footage from the time period immediately preceding a call to a HMDFE call center.
The images captured by these cameras could provide verification of negative or positive
feedback reported to the HMDFE call centers.202 It would not be efficient for the state to
analyze each reported incident independently to see if it was supported by what the
cameras picked up. But spot checks to ensure the accuracy of feedback reports could be
accomplished quite easily, and in cases involving high stakes (i.e., where one driver
assigns a large number of positive or negative points) evidence from these cameras would
go along way toward ensuring system accuracy.
A high-tech version of HMDFE will be more costly than a low-tech version, but
the savings associated with a higher-tech version could warrant the added expenditures,
particularly since automobile industry analysts expect the proliferation of vehicle-based
speech-recognition and GPS tracking technologies anyway in years to come.
199
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B.

Decreased Anonymity for Reporters

At first glance it may seem strange that a paper that began by bemoaning the ills
associated with anonymous driving has proposed a system of semi-anonymous feedback.
On balance, a system where call centers know the identity of a caller but drivers who
spark a complaint do not seems to strike the best balance among several objectives that
are at times in tension with one another. Caller anonymity will incentivize people to
report others’ misconduct, discourage retaliation, and promote accurate feedback (to the
extent that a fear of retaliation would discourage people from providing feedback). On
the other hand, caller anonymity would decrease transparency for the subjects of
complaints and would make it more difficult to correct maliciously false negative reports,
which will diminish the accuracy of feedback somewhat.
What underlies the paper’s tentative conclusion that complete anonymity vis a vis
targets of driving feedback is optimal? In part, it is a judgment that non-anonymous
feedback on eBay has manifested a Pollyanna effect, in that participants have an
incentive to provide positive feedback about transaction partners in order to increase the
likelihood that their transaction partners will in turn provide favorable feedback about
them.203 Because of this concern about retaliation, some participants who are not entirely
satisfied with the performance of a transaction partner leave unduly positive feedback,
and this marginally erodes the system’s ability to distinguish good vendors from excellent
ones.
In the driving context, we can expect to see a similar effect if anonymity is not
protected. Namely, A may forego providing negative feedback about B’s driving based
on a concern that B will retaliate against him by providing negative feedback about A.
This concern could be mitigated, somewhat, by a time lag in revelation, such that A
would be long gone by the time B learned of A’s feedback. But this feature would not
ameliorate the concern entirely in a low tech version of HMDFE since B might have
made note of the A’s unique identifier if he thought there was some risk that B’s driving
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would provoke a negative response from A. Because of these concerns about retaliation,
too few people would supply the public good that driving feedback represents.
This concern is even more pronounced in the aggressive driving context than in
the eBay context for a couple of reasons. First, the likelihood of violent retaliation is
higher in the driving context. Second, with aggressive drivers, we are talking about a
population that is prone to aggressive and retaliatory acts in many other facets of their
lives.204

Many aggressive drivers, in short, will tend to behave vindictively in an

environment where negative feedback hits them in the pocketbooks, and for that reason
protecting anonymity to some degree seems essential. Of course, callers should not be
entitled to remain anonymous with respect to HMD call centers, even though this lack of
anonymity will no doubt deter some callers from providing feedback. If callers are
permitted to leave completely anonymous reports, then HMD centers can do nothing to
ensure that a few drivers are not providing too much feedback, that some drivers are not
targeting other drivers with repeated negative or positive feedback, and that racial or
other biases are not prompting particular callers to leave inaccurate feedback.205 System
integrity, in short, demands that callers be accountable to the government, although not
directly to the targets of their complaints.
C.

Points Only, or Comments as Well?

One appealing aspect of an HMD system is its potential to educate drivers who
are oblivious about their shortcomings.206 Experimental interventions in the driving
context suggest that when drivers are provided with feedback regarding safety
performance from passengers in the vehicle, they are responsive to this feedback and
drive more safely in the future.207 In the commercial fleet setting, fleet operators obtain
the details of incident reports and use these details to train drivers in how to avoid
repeating the same mistakes in the future. This raises the design question of whether
204
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HMDFE feedback for everyone should include substantive comments about driving, or
whether the system should just report final results like +2 points or -1 point for a
particular incident. There is not an obviously right answer to this question. Comments
can educate or inflame. Some comments will be perceived by the targets of these
complaints to be so unfounded that they may erode support for the HMDFE scheme. On
the other hand, some motorists may be frustrated by the absence of substantive feedback,
especially if they routinely receive low marks from fellow drivers but cannot discern the
basis for that pattern. Indeed, substantive feedback on eBay seems successful, and helps
interested participants identify the reasoning behind negative or positive vendor reviews.
In the driving context, some feedback is particularly valued and valuable.
Separate surveys of both commercial fleet drivers and senior citizen motorists revealed a
similar dynamic: Drivers were quite receptive toward feedback about their driving
received from people with perceived expertise. More precisely, commercial fleet drivers
were quite welcoming of performance feedback from their company’s safety managers
and supervisors, as well as feedback from fellow drivers of commercial fleet vehicles.208
They were not receptive, by contrast, to feedback from drivers of passenger vehicles.209
Senior citizens were responsive to feedback from driving instructors, but grew somewhat
defensive when receiving feedback from people with no apparent expertise in drivingrelated matters.210 Let us assume this principal finding is broadly generalizable. Is there
a way to raise the quality of substantive feedback in a HMDFE system by identifying the
relevant experts?
The ideal HMDFE system would collect substantive feedback from all drivers,
but only report that feedback from those drivers with the most favorable HMD scores. In
other words, the drivers who received a relatively large number of positive points and a
relatively small number of negative points from fellow motorists would be free to
transmit substantive feedback (e.g., “changes lanes too frequently”) to other drivers,
whereas average and below-average drivers would only have the outcomes of their
207
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feedback (e.g., “add 1 point”; “subtract 2 points”) reported to others. Under such a
system, those drivers ranking in the top quartile of positive reviews would be entitled to
leave substantive feedback that other drivers could hear; all other drivers would be
muzzled. As a result, when drivers did receive substantive feedback about their driving,
it would be from drivers whom the system identified as possessing some expertise about
how to drive in an effective manner.
There are additional benefits associated with such a regime. It is likely that the
drivers ranked in the top quartile will be relatively courteous in their interactions with
fellow motorists.

Courteous drivers seem likely to provide relatively constructive

feedback to other motorists, so limiting this substantive feedback to a select few drivers
should also help ensure that motorists rarely hear inflammatory, expletive-laced feedback
about their own driving.211

Moreover, it is possible that motorists will value the

expressive benefits associated with being a highly-ranked driver. If so, enabling the top
ranked drivers to leave verbal feedback will create greater incentives for motorists to
drive in a manner that wins points from their anonymous peers.
Finally, collecting substantive comments in addition to points could serve an
important educational function for drivers. Once all the HMDFE feedback is collected, it
would be relatively easy for the state to publish data on which driving behaviors sparked
the most compliments and complaints. Motorists might be surprised to see, say, that
tailgating annoyed many drivers and that rolling stops did not, or that stealing parking
spots prompted very intense reactions, whereas moderate speeding prompted only mild
annoyance. Motorists who perused this data could adjust their own driving behaviors
accordingly in subsequent periods. The publication of such data would help satisfy some
due-process oriented concerns about citizen notice of the rules of the road. Moreover, it
would enable jurisdictions and insurers to monitor changes in driving norms over time.
The primary benefit, though, of using information aggregation technologies in this
context would be the creation of a parallel traffic code, one that approximated actual
motorists’ preferences and behaviors as closely as possible. HMDFE thus emerges as a
system that is capable of enforcing existing norms, but also becomes a system that can
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allow the state to identify emerging social norms. These norms can then be publicized to
members of the public, perhaps hastening the process by which they become efficient
focal points for human behavior.212
Having described the trees, a few words about this forest are in order. The
foregoing analysis suggests the potential for HMDFE to produce, as a by-product, a
universal and comprehensive driving code that perfectly reflects the preferences of
American drivers and is capable of changing on a dime in response to preference shifts.
We might conceptualize such a code as the product of hyperdemocratic decisionmaking.
It certainly makes other forms of direct democracy, like the initiative process, look
republican and clunky in comparison. Unlike any other law on the books, such a law
would provide citizens with precise notice of the rules of the road as enforced. That is
something no other sort of law presently does.
D.

One Car, One Vote?

This discussion of differential feedback abilities brings to mind a further
programmatic variation. To date, the discussion has assumed that the feedback structure
would permit something like cumulative voting. Under such a scheme, each driver might
be allotted fifteen positive points and fifteen negative points each month, which could be
assigned to thirty different vehicles or two different vehicles, depending on the intensity
of the driver’s reaction to another drivers’ conduct.

All along, the discussion has

assumed something along the lines of one car, one vote.
It may be that an optimal system would involve deviations from this system. For
example, the system probably should allot more points to motorists who spend more of
their time on the roadways, and miles driven would be an adequate proxy for this.
Similarly, motorists who receive very positive marks from their peers could be allotted
extra points each month, or could have their points weighted more heavily than those
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who receive middling or poor feedback.213 Indeed, the system might well ignore the
feedback provided by the worst drivers, since those drivers could be penalizing driving
behavior that the vast majority of motorists regard as safe and cooperative.214
Even if the HMDFE system adhered to a one car, one vote principle, insurance
companies might still be able to obtain some of the gains associated with deviations from
that principle. If the raw data from HMDFE is shared with insurers, then insurance
companies could test various voting models and try to better predict risks. Actuaries thus
could function as lab technicians, constantly tinkering with new models for weighing
feedback, and the government eventually could piggy back on this work, adopting the
weighting algorithms that proved most successful in the private insurance market.
This discussion of some of the variations and design issues that would arise in
implementation of a HMDFE regime reveals how much the regime can accomplish and
how much rides on the details. Other details of the program, such as the optimal voting
scheme, seem open to reasoned debate.215

V.

“How’s My Driving?” for Everything?
In a standard thought paper, a concluding section discusses the various ways in

which the model proposed might be extended to other settings.

There is some

awkwardness in writing that section of this paper. After all, my proposal itself extends
two related ideas – commercial fleet HMD programs and eBay-style electronic reputation
tracking – to a much larger arena. Nevertheless, we can conceptualize this paper’s
213
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proposal as a new paradigm for the enforcement of societal rules. In public spaces where
social norms are reasonably well developed and universal, and where policing by
government agents is inherently problematic, we can rely heavily on citizens themselves
to police misconduct.
As this paper suggested earlier,216 work by social norms scholars has suggested
that efficient citizen enforcement can happen naturally in close knit groups, where repeat
player interactions are common, information pertinent to social control flows easily, and
relations among actors are somewhat multiplex and not too hierarchical.217

But in

environments where those conditions do not hold, i.e., among loose-knit groups, social
order sometimes breaks down, necessitating a substantial police presence. The idea
behind this paper is to use technology to transform loose-knit environments into closeknit environments, so that the police presence can be curtailed substantially without
compromising safety.

These schemes therefore replace state policing with citizen

policing, laws with norms, and, to some extent, rules with standards. In thinking about
extensions of the approach, then, it makes sense to think about other loose-knit
environments where social order sometimes breaks down.
At the same time, there will be social settings in which technologically aided
norm enforcement is undesirable. I am thinking, in particular, of those settings in which
conformity is bad and majoritarian norms are invasive. For example, we would recoil at
the thought of “How’s My Speech?” being used to sanction political dissidents. When
political dissent is at issue, society has long recognized the value in letting unpopular or
unfashionable arguments be voiced.

Similarly, using “How’s My Art?” to award

National Endowment for the Arts grants could well reward those artists whose work was
not artistically excellent but coincided with the aesthetic preferences of the median voter.
And, in a different vein, we must recognize the problems that would arise if we tried to
use a “How’s My Driving?” for Everything approach to deal with matters about which
preferences are very idiosyncratic. For example, such technologies could take some of

feedback during the next year or two, but applying a multiplier to the fine if they receive similar feedback
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the risk out of blind dates,218 but romantic tastes are certainly variable enough to warrant
skepticism about the approach, and hurt feelings may prompt people to leave inaccurate
feedback following instances of unreciprocated attraction. Indeed, for these reasons,
online dating web sites that have incorporated reviews and references do not seem to
have been particularly successful.219 In short, when the very high emotional stakes
associated with dating are combined with highly individuated preferences, the false
feedback problem becomes almost insurmountable.
There will be other settings in which conformity is relatively uncontroversial and
median voter instincts are sensible but the costs of using HMD technologies to police
misconduct exceed the benefits. Take pedestrian activity in public spaces. Interactions
among pedestrians on a sidewalk, at a block party, or outside a concert venue are usually
reasonably orderly for a variety of reasons: people interact with others face to face,
people may be accompanied by a few acquaintances amidst the crowd, people may fear
police intervention or mob justice if they act boorishly, and many people have
internalized norms that cause them to behave in a considerate fashion. In a sciencefiction world, we can imagine a “How’s My Walking?” for Everyone system that
eliminates anonymity in public spaces.220 Were we to hand people remote controls and
let them play a reputational version of laser tag, where their point totals would be posted
on the Internet for employers, parents, blind dates, and parole officers to see, public
misconduct would be deterred substantially. This regime would be one in which
obscurity in public spaces disappeared entirely, but at what cost?. Such a regime only
would be appropriate in those environments where public misconduct has reached crisis
levels.
In looking for successful applications of “How’s My Driving?” for everything,
then, we should seek out contexts in which conformity is unproblematic, median voter
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judgments are informative, a broad social consensus exists regarding appropriate
behavior, and the benefits of reputation tracking exceed the costs.

For illustrative

purposes, we can begin with a context where the disorder resulting from anonymity is not
severe, but for which the costs of implementing a reputation tracking system would be so
low as to render an intervention plausibly worthwhile. The vast majority of hotel guests
are perfectly cooperative, desiring little more than a clean room and a good night’s sleep.
But most readers have probably had the misfortune to be assigned a room next door to
inconsiderate outliers on multiple occasions.

Many people, being essentially

nonconfrontational, simply endure the noise. Others bang on walls or ask the front-desk
employees to intervene, sometimes with minimal success. The problem, of course, is that
hotels cannot identify the noisy patrons in advance, and customers are given no
opportunities to choose their neighbors. It is not difficult to imagine a straightforward
“How’s My Neighboring?” program for hotel guests, which would enable hotels to
exclude the noisy (or confine them to a particularly well insulated portion of the hotel)
and allow everyone else to enjoy a decent night’s sleep. The idea, then, is to make
reputations for noisiness transportable across hotels.

More controversially, we can

imagine the application of HMDFE variations to public policy issues large (facilitating
the accurate reporting of parental abuse and neglect of their children) and small
(permitting the sanctioning of neighbors who leave their trash cans at the curbside for too
long after pickup day).

Without exploring all these variations, we should turn our

attention to three settings in which these reputation systems seem particularly promising.
The first is military operations. I am not talking about trench warfare here or
hand-to-hand combat. Increasingly, members of the military are called upon to engage in
peace-keeping operations where aggravating the local population is detrimental to
mission objectives.

Law-abiding Iraqis are constantly witnessing some American

soldiers behaving well and a few behaving quite badly. Yet there is no systematic effort
to harness this information in a way that might improve military training and conduct.
Now, there is an obvious challenge here. We do not want insurgents rating G.I.s, because
they will probably phone in complaints about the most competent soldiers. But if the
law-abiding population outnumbers the insurgent population by a sufficient margin, and
if reporting on the quality of individual solders is made easy enough, then this problem
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can be solved. And of course it may well be that creating this highly visible form of
accountability creates extraordinary good will among the occupied.
The same arguments hold true in the context of police officers, and “How’s My
Policing?” programs in high-crime areas might be a promising strategy.221 Again, we do
not particularly want criminals complaining about cops, but if there is a way to encourage
ordinary citizens to lodge compliments and complaints about particular officers in a lowcost way, then the benefits would be substantial. Opportunities to do this exist in the
present system. A citizen can jot down a badge number and call a precinct or write a
letter to a police commissioner. But the costs of doing so are rather high, and the lack of
a visible and regular process for leaving feedback surely deters people from providing
police departments with valuable information that could be used to improve policing.
There is a third type of environment in which reputation tracking and feedback
systems may be particularly advantageous. It is an environment that is hard to describe,
however, because it does not yet exist. As discussed in the paragraphs above, “How’s
My Driving?” for Everything may prove successful when a well-developed set of norms
already exists. But recall the preceding discussion of how HMD programs might also
permit us to create a “traffic code” that can be updated to reflect real-time changes in
drivers’ preferences and behaviors.222 On this model, we can use “How’s My Driving?”
for Everything to create hyper-democratic rules in new environments characterized by
loose-knit interactions. Surveying the past decade or so, scores of new environments like
this have sprouted up, mostly in cyberspace: Internet chat rooms, online poker
tournaments, peer-to-peer file swapping networks, massively multi-user online games,
Craig’s List, comments sections on blogs, and many more. The designers of these new
environments often have to guess about what types of rules to impose on their users, and
mistakes will be inevitable. Harnessing technologies that let anonymous users to rate
each other’s behavior and explain the basis for their high or low ratings will often be a
highly beneficial means of giving users the types of rules they want and galvanizing user
opinion around desirable innovations. Nobody knows what new loose-knit environments
221
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will emerge in the coming decades. But we have enough information to suspect that in
the new environments that do emerge, “How’s My Driving?” for Everything technologies
stand poised to help create and enforce the norms that will regulate behavior therein.

VI.

Conclusion
The regime advanced in this paper represents a re-thinking of the way that we

currently regulate traffic. It examines the costs of anonymous driving and finds them to
be quite substantial, resulting in aggressive and unsafe behavior that kills thousands of
Americans each year and makes tens of millions of commuters miserable. Although
anonymous driving has become a fundamental fact of urban, suburban, and exurban
driving environments, this anonymity can be curtailed. Indeed, urban driver anonymity
seems like a relic from a bygone era, out of place in the information age. Just as eBay’s
reputation tracking system tamed e-commerce fraud rather effectively, “How’s My
Driving?” for Everyone might rein in aggressive, inconsiderate, and unsafe driving.
“How’s My Driving?” programs appear to improve commercial fleet accident
rates substantially, although more research on this front is certainly warranted. Assuming
that further study confirms the very promising initial industry data, the state should
strongly consider extending these programs to passenger vehicles, and there are strong
reasons to favor universality within a given jurisdiction. At any given moment, there are
millions of American drivers who are watching their fellow motorists behave badly.
Many of these drivers mutter to themselves about their peers’ misconduct, growing
increasingly frustrated with their driving experience. At times, this frustration boils over
into extreme acts of road rage. These opinions are formed, the information exists, and it
is being vocalized to passengers or to no one in particular. All the government needs to
do is harness this information.

In so doing, the government would be delegating

substantial traffic regulation duties to its drivers, in one fell swoop eliminating the need
for vast numbers of traffic police, enabling insurers to price automobile premiums in a
more individuated, less discriminatory manner, and quite possibly, making urban driving
fun again.
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